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JOINDER OF PARTIES*
CHARLES E. CLARK and HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.
The subject of joinder of parties is peculiarly interesting in
that it shows the growing tendency to develop procedural rules
towards the end of prompt dispatch of litigation. At common
law the rules of party-joinder depended entirely on what was
conceived to be the substantive rights of the parties litigant;
and the idea of employing the rules of joinder as a procedural
device to save many trials by deciding at one time issues affect-
ing several persons came later through the code adoption of the
more liberal equity rules of joinder. Even under the code the
idea was only imperfectly perceived or carried out and it is only
now in a few jurisdictions-notably England, New York and
New Jersey-that the possibilities of thus somewhat relieving
the press of cases upon the courts are being at all adequately
realized. The subject can best be understood by tracing this
course of development through the various systems of pleading.
JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS-BEFORE THE CODES
Compulsory joinder at common law. Plaintiffs were compelled
to join or could join, at common law, only in a limited class of
cases where their rights were joint. Thus in a contract action,
whenever the interests of the promisees were interpreted as
joint by the court, the promisees had to sue together in any
action on the contract.' Partners, for example were required
to join in suing on obligations owing the partnership. If one of
the promisees died, the survivor or survivors only were allowed
to sue on the contract.2 Likewise in tort actions, joinder of
*The substance of this article, together with additions dealing with the
subjects of intervention and the bringing in of new parties will form a
chapter in a forthcoming book on Code Pleading, to be published by the
West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.
I Slingsby's Case, 5 Co. 18 b (1588) (covenant); see Comment (1923) 32
YALE LAW JOURNAL 384. In a note to Eccleston v. Clipshamn, 1 Saund. 153
(20 Car. II), the early cases are summarized as follows: "If the covenant
be so constructed as to be ambiguous. . . then it will be joint if the interests
are joint, and several if the interests are several. On the other hand, if it
be in terms unmistakeably joint, then, though the interest be several, all the
parties must be joined in the action. So, if the covenant be clearly several,
the action must be several, though the interest be joint. It is a question of
construction." See, further, Calvert v. Bradley, 16 How. 580 (U. S. 1853) ;
Baker v. Peterson, 133 N. E. 214 (Ill. 1921), (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 369.
The same rule applied to actions of assumpsit. Moore v. Chesley, 17 N. H.
151 (1845); see Bradley's Ex'rs v. Maull, 4 Harr. 223 (Del. 1843). Also
when the action was quasi-contractual, if the plaintiff had to rely on the
contract to prove his case. See Buddle v. Willson, 6 Term R. 369 (1795), A
[28]
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plaintiffs turned upon the distinction between joint and several
interests. Hence when the plaintiffs were joint owners of prop-
erty which was damaged, they had to bring their action for
damages jointly. The most typical tort cases within this rule
were suits by joint tenants, joint owners, and parceners and
certain suits by tenants in common.3
Effect of nonjoinder at common law. If the defendant objected
in the proper manner that parties were not joined who should
have been under the technical rules just stated, severe penalties
were attached. In contract actions, while the defendant could
raise the point by a plea in abatement 4 he could also rely on
promissory note to "A or B" was interpreted as joint vithin this rule.
Willoughby v. Willoughby, 5 N. H. 244 (1830).
If the defendant had settled with some of the joint contractees, the other
or others could sue alone in some jurisdictions. Baker v. Jewel, 0 Mass.
460 (1810) ; Beach v. Hotchkiss, 2 Conn. 697 (1818). In other jurisdictions
they could sue for their share in the name of all, even against the consent
of those who had settled. Sweigart v. Berk, 8 Serg. & R. 30S (Pa. 1822) ;
cf. Cunningham v. Carpenter, 10 Ala. 109 (1846) (party objecting to join-
der was indemnified for costs); Chambers v. Donaldson, 9 East 471 (1808)
(fraudulent collusion between plaintiff's husband who refused to join and
defendants).
2Rolls v. Yate, Yelv. 177 (1611); Anderson v. Martindale, 1 East 497
(1801) ; Teed v. Elworthy, 14 East 210 (1811) ; Smith v. Franklin, 1 Mass.
480 (1805). Upon the death of the last contractee, the cause of action
descended to his personal representative alone. Bebee v. Miller, Minor
364 (Ala. 1824). Of course, the cause of action had to be one that sur-
vived the person. And the excuse for not joining the other contractees had
to be stated in the declaration. Holyoke v. Loud, 69 Me. 59 (1879) ; Percival
v. McCoy, 4 McCrary 418 (W. D. Iowa, 1882).
3Joint tenants: Pullen v. Palmer, 5 Mod. 72 (6 Win. & M.) (avowry for
rent). Joint owners: Winterstoke Hundred's Case, 3 Dye. 370a (22 Eliz.);
Turnpike Co. v. Fry, 88 Tenn. 296 (1889); see Child v. Sands, 1 Salh. 31
(5 Win. & M.); Whitney v. Stark, 8 Cal. 514 (1857). Parceners: A.Cn-
BOLD, PLEADING (1824) 52. Tenants in common: Joinder was required in the
so-called personal actions. State v. True, 25 Mo. App. 451 (1887) (injury
to chattel held in common); Louisville Ry. v. Hart, 119 Ind. 273 (1889)
(same); Hays v. Farwell & Co., 53 Kan. 78 (1894) (conversion); Gent
v. Lynch, 23 Md. 58 (1865) (trespass to land). But not in the so-called
mixed actions. Curtis v. Bourn, 2 Mod. 62 (27 Car. II). In the real actions,
joinder was not allowed. Moore v. Fursden, 1 Show. 342 (3 Win. & M.)
(ejectment); Heatherly v. Weston, 2 Wils. 232 (1764) (same); Throckmor-
ton v. Burr, 5 Cal. 400 (1855) (same); but see Denne v. Judge, 11 East
288 (1809). Tenants in common could join or sever in debt for rent -when
they jointly demised reserving an entire rent, but if there were separate
demises, they had to sue separately. See Wilkinson v. Hall, 1 Bing. N. C.
713 (1835).
4 Scott v. Godwin, 1 Bos. & P. 67 (1797) (erroneously cited in Baker v.
Jewell, supra note 1, as holding that defendant could only enter a general
demurrer); Hilliker v. Loop, 5 Vt. 116 (1833). Such a plea would rarely
be made, for the defendant could gain a nonsuit by raising the point at
trial under the general issue.
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the general issie if the defect did not appear in the declaration.,
If the omission was apparent on the record, he could enter a
general demurrer 6 or even move in arrest of judgment 7 or bring
a writ of error.8 But in tort actions, if the defect did not appear,
the defendant could object to nonjoinder only by pleading it in
abatement., In case he failed to do this, he could not later raise
the point. Furthermore, the party omitted could later sue
alone.10 If the defect was apparent, there is some authority to
the effect that the defendant tortfeasor could enter a demurrer
or move in arrest of judgment."
Permissive joinder at common law. No permissive joinder
as such, where plaintiffs whose rights were several, had the
option of joining, was permitted at common law. Thus, if the
plaintiffs' interests in a contract were several, or so interpreted
by the court, no joinder of plaintiffs was allowed no matter how
many common questions of law or fact were involved. 12 In tort
actions, even though a single act of the defendant caused injury
to several people, they could not join unless the property or
interest injured was jointly held by them, 3 or unless the damage
was considered "entire." 14 Joinder as a procedural device to
shorten litigation was not contemplated at common law.
r Smith v. Crichton, 33 Md. 103 (1870) (pon assumpsit) ; Young v. Hes-
selmeyer, 34 Mo. 76 (1863) (holding also that the point could not be raised
by a motion in arrest of judgment); Hill v. Tucker, 1 Taunt. 7 (1807);
see note in 1 Win. Saund. 153.
6Anderson v. Martindale, supra note 1.
7 See Hicks v. Branton, 21 Ark. 186 (1860).
S See note in 1 Win. Saund. 153; Dawson v. George, 193 S. IV. 495 (Tox.
Civ. App. 1917) (appeal).
9 Addison v. Overend, 6 Term R. 766 (1796) ; Bloxam v. Hubbard, 5 East
407 (1804); Fell v. Bennett, 110 Pa. 181 (1895); Thompson v. Hoskins, 11
Blass. 419 (1814).
10 Sedgeworth v. Overend, 7 Term R. 279 (1797).
" See 15 ENCY. OF PL. AND PR. (1899) 569.
" Tippet v. Hawkey, 3 Mod. 263 (1 Win. & M.); Curtis v. Sprague, 61
Cal. 239 (1876); Governor v. Webb, 12 Ga. 189 (1852); Pelly v. Bowyer, 7
Bush 513 (Ky. 1870).
23 The reason given for not allowing joinder here was, "nor is there any
rule, in a case like this, to apportion damages-one may have suffered false
imprisonment, another the loss of his property and a third, only vexation of
mind." Ainsworth v. Allen, Kirby 145 (Conn. 1786). See also Rhoades
v. Booth, 14 Iowa 575 (1863) (malicious prosecution); Smith v. Cooker, Cro.
Car. 512 (14 Car. I) (slander). Husband and wife could not join, even
though both were injured by a single act of the defendant. A note in (1923)
25 A. L. R. 739 to Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 121 S. C. 72, 113 S. E. 474
(1922) collects the cases on this point. But partners could join for a slan-
der in respect of their joint business. Cook v. Batchelor, 3 Bos. & P. 150
(1802); Patten v. Gurney, 17 Mass. 182 (1821). But no damages to per-
sonal feelings, etc., -could be recovered in such an action. Haythorn v.
Lawson, 3 Car. & P. 196 (1827).
.4 Coryton v. Litheby, 2 Saund. 115 (22 Car. II) (owners of two separate
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Effect of misjoinder at commoit law. If too many plaintiffs
were joined, it was fatal to the plaintiff's case. In contract ac-
tions, if the misjoinder was apparent from the declaration, the
defendant could enter a general demurrer 1 or move in arrest of
judgment.-0 If the misjoinder did not appear in the pleadings, it
was ground for a nonsuit whenever it appeared at trialY.7 These
same harsh rules applied to tort actions. 8
Computsory joinder in equity. The aim of the equity courts
was to settle an entire transaction in a single suit whenever such
course was convenient and could be followed without prejudice
to the defendant. 9 Joinder was compulsory for all persons with-
out whom a complete settlement of the transaction could not be
effected.20 (1) Everyone whose interests would be directly af-
fected by the decree was thus an indispensable or at least qzccas-
sary party as distinguished from merely a proper party.2' For
instance, in a suit to partition land, equity required that all who
mills, which together had a concession to grind the corn of all the tenants
of the manor, joined in suing a tenant who had ground his corn elsewhere);
Weller v. Baker, 2 Wils. 414 (1769).
'5 White v. Portland, 67 Conn. 272, 34 Atl. 1022 (1896); Governor v.
Webb, supra note 12.16 McNulty v. O'Donnell, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 93 (1904); see Lockhart v.
Power, 2 Watts 371 (Pa. 1834). The point was raised on writ of error in
Cofran v. Shepard, 148 Mass. 582 (1889).17 Ulmer v. Cunningham, 2 Me. 117 (1822).
Is "And the objection may be taken on the trial in arrest, or by appeal, or
writ of error, and especially when such misjoinder of parties does not ap-
pear from the plaintiff's petition ... if upon the trial, or in any stage of
the case, the misjoinder appears, defendant may avail himself of the defect."
Rhoades v. Booth, 14 Iowa 575, 577 (1863); see also Leavet v. Sherman, 1
Root 159 (Conn. 1790).
19 See City Bank v. Bartlett, 71 Ga. 797 (1883); Wilson v. Castro, 31
Cal. 420 (1866); SToRY, EQUITY PLEADING (8 ed. 1870) § 76c; Clark, The
Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JouRNAL 817, 818.
20Browne v. Blount, 2 Russ. & M. 83 (1830); McPike v. Wells, 54 Miss.
136 (1876). See, more specifically, Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130 (U. S.
1854) (rescission); Reformed Church v. Nelson, 35 Ohio St. 638 (1880)
(will); Dameron v. Jamison, 71 Mo. 97 (1879) (partition); Pillow v.
Sentelle, 39 Ark. 61 (1882) (mortgage foreclosure); Cullum v. Lub-Tex
Motor Co., 267 S. W. 322 (Teox. Civ. App. 1924) (quiet title); Long v. Pritt,
92 W. Va. 73, 114 S. E. 512 (1922) (partition); Wilson v. Reeves County
Water Imp. Dist., 256 S. W. 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (enjoining divers--ion
of water) ; Mfgrs. Light Co. v. Lemasters, 91 W. Va. 1, 112 S. E. 201 (1922)
(to determine ownership of cash fund).
21 These are the terms used by the United States Supreme Court and
perhaps most usual in equity pleading to distinguish the kinds of parties.
Shields v. Barrow, supra note 20; CLEPHANE, EQUITY PLEADING (1926) 25-
48. It has been objected that the terms "necessary" and "indispensable"
convey the same idea. Mathieson v. Craven, 164 Fed. 471 (D. Del. 1908).
But a distinction has been drawn. While necessary parties are so inter-
ested in the controversy that they should normally be made parties in order
to enable the court to do complete justice, yet if their interests are separ-
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had interests in that land should be joined.22 (2) A person
might also be a necessary party for the complete protection of
some other person who would at all events be directly affected
by the decree. Every one jointly interested in the subject of the
action within the common law rules of joinder (joint promisees,
joint tenants, etc.) came within this second class because their
joinder protected the defendant against a multiplicity of suits.3
Necessary parties in equity were not always parties plaintiff.
When anyone, who by reason of his interest would ordinarily
be a plaintiff, could not be joined 24 or refused to join 25 in the
bill, he could be made a defendant, if the reason for his not being
joined was stated in the bill.2r The most important exception to
the rule that all these necessary parties had to appear on record
was the class suit, or doctrine of representation discussed below.,'
Effect of nonjoinder in equity. In equity the plaintiff could
always amend to remedy a defect of parties.28 Nonjoinder of
necessary parties was properly raised, if it was apparent from
the face of the record, by a special demurrer in which the omitted
parties were designated.2 If the lack of parties went only to a
able from the rest and particularly where their presence in the suit cannot
be obtained, they are not indispensable parties. The latter are those with-
out whom the court cannot proceed. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co.,
184 -U. S. 199, 22 Sup. Ct. 308 (1902); Atwood v. R. I. Hospital Trust
Co., 275 Fed. 513, 24 A. L. R. 156 (C. C. A. 1st, 1921), rev'g 264 Fed. 360,
255 Fed. 162, certiorari denied 42 Sup. Ct. 270 (1922) ; Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. Smith, 266 U. S. 152, 45 Sup: Ct. 26 (1925). See also Franz v. Buder,
11 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Interstate Refineries v. Barry, 7 F.
(2d) 548 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Fineman v. Cutler, 273 Pa. 189, 116 Atl. 819
(1922) ; Walrath v. Roberts, 12 F. (2d) 443 (N. D. Cal. 1925) ; Independent
Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 45 Sup. Ct. 166 (1926); Cobb v. Interstate
Mortgage Corp., 20 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); (1926) 35 YA= LAW
JouRNAL 1018; (1926) 20 ILL. L. REv. 726.
22 Long v. Pritt, supra note 20.
23 Joint contractees had to sue together in equity. Himes v. Schmehl,
257 Fed. 69 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919). And joint contractors had to be sued
together. Hull v. Eidt-Summerfield Co., 204 S. W. 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
And, as at law, joint tortfeasors could be sued jointly or severally. Grow
v. Seligman, 47 Mich. 607 (1882); Armstrong v. Savannah Soap Works,
53 Fed. 124 (S. D. Ga. 1892); Courthope v. Mapplesden, 10 Ves. Jr. 290
(1804).24 Parkman's Adm'r's v. Aicardi, 34 Ala. 393 (1859) (absence from state);
Whitney v. Mayo, 15 Ill. 251 (1853); see Ins. Co. of North America v.
Svendsen, 74 Fed. 346 (D. S. C. 1896).
25 Billings v. Mann, 156 Mass. 203 (1892); see Osgood v. Franklin, 2
Johns. Oh. 1 (N. Y. 1816).26 Bengley v. Wheeler, 45 Mich. 493 (1881). If it was not stated, a
special demurrer lay. Morse v. Hovey, 9 Paige 197 (N. Y. 1841).
27 See infra page 57.
2S Postlewait v. Howes, 3 Iowa 365 (1856); Whitney v. Cotten, 53 Miss.
689 (1876); Perham v. Haverhill Fibre Co., 64 N. H. 2 (1885); see Ilol-
land v. Trotter, 22 Gratt. 136 (Va. 1872).29 Oliva v. Bunaforza, 31 N. J. Eq. 396 (1879) (general demurrer over-
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part of the relief sought, the demurrer had to be directed to that
part of the bill only ° If the nonjoinder was not evident from
the record, the defendant put in a plea or answer in bar.3' But
the lack of necessary parties could be raised later in the pro-
ceedings. Indeed, the court, of its own motion, could at any
time refuse to go on until necesary parties were brought in.22
Of course, if the omitted parties were merely "proper parties"
the defect was not as serious. The defendant generally could
raise the question of their nonjoinder only preliminarilyP
Permissive joinder in equity. The usual statement was that
plaintiffs were allowed to join in equity if they were interested
in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded.
In view of the adoption of this phraseology in the codes, its
meaning in equity is important. It was to be understood not as
a strict requirement for every case, but as a justification for
joinder in a particular case. The statement was affirmative, not
negative. The rule, thus stated, was obviously and purposely
so general that new situations might be brought within it as
occasion demanded. The chancellors constantly emphasized that
the application of the rule was largely within the discretion of
the court, and that the purpose guiding this discretion was to
prevent a multiplicity of suits by allowing joinder whenever the
issues could be conveniently settled together. As no jury trial
was involved, there was no need to simplify the issues to as
great an extent as in the law courts. Accordingly, every plain-
tiff did not need to be interested in all the relief sought.--
Among the common situations where joinder was allowed in
equity were when owners of separate lands united to enjoin a
common injury or nuisance 1 or the levy of an illegal tax or
rate; - when persons injured by the same or identical fraudulent
ruled with costs and with leave to amend); see Greenleaf v. Queen, 1 Pet.
138 (U. S. 1828).30 Weston v. Blake, 61 Me. 452 (1873).
3 Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 222 (N. Y. 1832) ; Plunkett v. Penon, 2
Atk. 51 (1740); Moore v. Moore, 74 N. J. Eq. 733, 70 Ati. 684 (1903).
32 Shields v. Barrow, supra note 20.
33Chambers v. Robbins, 28 Conn. 552 (1859).
-4Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 139 (N. Y. 1822); Brown v. Guar-
antee Trust Co., 128 U. S. 403, 9 Sup. Ct. 125 (1888); Ballou v. Inhabi-
tants of Hopkinton, 4 Gray 324 (Mass. 1855) ; Addison v. Walker, 4 Younge
& C. 442 (1841); Parr v. Att'y Gen., 8 Clarke & F. 409 (1842); Worthy v.
Johnson, 8 Ga. 236 (1850); Gates v. Boomer, 17 Wis. 455 (1803).
35 Cloyes v. Middlebury Electric Co., 80 Vt. 109, 00 At. 1039, 11 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 693 (1907) annotation; Murray v. Hay, I Barb. Ch. 59 (N. Y.
1845); Gillespie v. Forrest, 18 Hun 110 (N. Y. 1S79); Foreman v. Boyle,
88 Cal. 290 (1891); Marsh v. Fairbury, 163 Ill. 401 (1896); see Heagy v.
Black, 90 Ind. 543, 536 (1883); Rowbotham v. Robbins, 47 N. J. Eq. 337
(1890).
36 Simons Sons Co. v. Md. Tel. Co., 99 Md. 141, 57 AtI. 193 (1904) ; Gage
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misrepresentations sued to be put in statu quo; 3 and when
creditors who had recovered separate judgments against a com-
mon debtor brought a creditor's bill.38 The cases indicate that
the result of the equity practice before the codes might be more
accurately stated: that joinder was allowed whenever the plain-
tiffs were interested in the subject of the action or (not and) in
the relief demanded.39
If, within the rules just described, the equity court thought
that the subject matter of the suit involved such distinct and
separate matters that the defendant would be prejudiced by
having them settled at the same time, the bill was declared mul-
tifarious.40
Effect of misjoinder in equity. A misjoinder of parties was
raised by demurrer when it appeared in the bill ;4 otherwise, by
plea or answer. 42  In the case of a misjoinder of defendants,
however, only the party misjoined could complain .4  Amendment
was always allowed, unless the bill was made multifarious by
the misjoinder,4- and even if the bill was dismissed for mis-
joinder it was without prejudice to a new suit.45 Usually the
misjoinder was deemed waived if not objected to early in the
pleadings," but the court, of its own motion, could refuse to go
on until the misjoinder was cured by amendment.4"
v. Chapman, 56 Ill. 311 (1870); Mt. Carbon Coal Co. v. Blanchard, 54 Il1.
240 (1870).
37 Reardon v. Dickinson, 100 So. 715 (La. 1924); Rader v. Bristol Land
Co., 94 Va. 766, 27 S. E. 590 (1897); Bosher v. Richmond and H. L. Co.,
89 Va. 455, 16 S. E. 360 (1892).
38 Gates v. Boomer, supra note 34.
39 In addition to the cases already cited, the following tend to bear out
this statement. Buie v. Mechanics Bldg. Ass'n, 74 N. C. 117 (1876); West-
ern Land Co. v. Guinault, 37 Fed. 523 (E. D. La. 1889); Almond v. Wilson,
75 Va. 613 (1881). As to the history of these phrases under the code, see
the next section.
40 Bertelmanm v. Lucas, 7 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; Rountrie v
Satterfield, 100 So. 751 (Ala. 1924); CLEPHANE, op. cit. supra note 21, at
212-214.
47 Stookey v. Carter, 92 Ill. 129 (1879) ; Hendrickson v. Wallace, 31 N. 3.
Eq. 604 (1879) (waived by failure to demur).
42 McElroy v. McElroy, 142 Ga. 37, 82 S. E. 422 (1914); In re Young's
Estate, 63 Or. 120, 126 Pac. 992 (1912).43 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Lee, 188 Fed. 621 (W. D. Wash. 1912); Emerson
v. Gaither, 103 Md. 564, 64 Atl. 26 (1906).44 Hanks v. North, 58 Iowa 396 (1882) (the plaintiff who was misjoined
was allowed to withdraw; no amendment needed); Hubbard v. Manhattan
Trust Co., 87 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 2d, 1898).
45House v. Mullen, 22 Wall. 42 (U. S. 1874).
"6Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla. 110 (1853); Hill v. Houk, 155
Ala. 448, 46 So. 562 (1908).
4 Wells v. Sewell's Point Guano Co., 89 Va. 708, 17 S. E. 2 (1893); see
Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333 (U. S. 1845).
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JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS-UNDER THE CODES
Compulsory joiuder. The first part of the provision found
in practically all the codes, dealing with compulsory joinder of
plaintiffs reads: "Of the parties to the action, those who are
united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." "
It is evident that the codes thus adopt the equity rule that all
whose interests would be directly affected by the decree are
necessary parties, and such is the result of the decisions.4 And
if any person is a necessary party only in the sense that his pres-
ence is needed for the complete protection of the defendant's
interests, he must still be joined under the code,:° subject to
the exceptions formerly allowed by the equity courts.5' One of
these exceptions is expressly written into the codes. Thus,
48 Alaska Code (1913) § 871; Ala. Code (1923) § 5701; Ariz. Rev. Stat.
(1913) § 416; Ark. Dig. Stat. (1921) § 1097; Cal. C. C. P. (1923) § "82;
Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) § 6649; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 277;
Iowa Code (1924) § 10973; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 60-412; Ky. Ann.
Civ. Code (Seymour, 1924) § 24; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 1159; Mont. Rev.
Code (1921) § 9083; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 8542; Nev. Ri. L. (1912)
§ 5001; N. M. Ann. Stat. (1915) § 4073; N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act. (1920) §
194; N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 457; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 7106;
§ 5001; N. M. Ann. Stat. (1915) § 4073; N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1920) §
220; Or. C. C. P. (1920) § 68; Porto Rico R. S. & Codes (1911) § 5050;
S. C. C. C. P. (1922) § 362; S. D. Rev. Code (1919) § 2315; Utah Comp.
Laws (1917) §6510; Wis. Stat. (1921) § 2604; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) §
5594. Fed. Eq. Rules (1912) § 37 is practically the same. The Washington
provision reads: "All persons interested in the cause of action, or nccezsary
to the complete determination of the questions involved, shall, unless oth'cr-
wise provided by law, be joined as plaintiffs when their interest is in com-
mon with the party making the complaint, and as defendants when their
interest is adverse to the plaintiff." Wash. Comp. Stat. (Rcm. 1922) § 189.
45 See, for example, Henry v. Bank, 302 Mo. 684, 259 S.W. 462 (1924)
(grantor necessary party to suit affecting title to land that he conveyed
with covenants of warranty); South Penn Oil Co. v. Miller, 175 Fed. 729
(C. C. A. 4tK, 1909) (lessor necessary party to suit affecting title to the
leased land); Matagorda Canal Co. v. Markham Irr. Co., 154 S. W. 1176
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913).so Phillips v. Poole, 96 Ga. 515, 23 S. E. 504 (1895) (joint obligezs must
join); Meredith v. Punxsutawney Nat'l Bank, 119 Atl. 586 (Pa. 1923)
(joint contractees); Lee v. Ricca, 241 Pac. 50S (Ariz. 1925); Pitth v.
Crane, 236 Pac. 475 (Or. 1925); Natter v. Blanchard Co., 153 App. Div.
814, 138 N. Y. Supp. 969 (1st Dept. 1912); Davis & Holmes Land Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 152 N. E. 723 (Ind. 1926); Eno v. Knox, 44 S. D. 313,
184 N. W. 206 (1921); Fineman v. Cutler, 116 Atl. 319 (Pa. 1922).
Tenants in common are, of course, allowed to join as plaintiffs under the
codes in personal actions as at common law. Sawers Grain Co. v. Good-
win, 83 Ind. App. 556, 146 N. E. 837 (1926) (conversion). They are now
also allowed to join in the so-called "real actions." Hunt v. Mounts, 101 W.
Va. 205, 133 S. E. 323 (1926) (ejectment) ; see Shelby v. Shelby, 194 Ky.
141, 238 S. W. 371 (1922) (defendant may object if only one co-tenant sues
in ejectment).
-3 See sv.pra notes 24-23.
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whereas at law all persons whose interests were interpreted as
joint had to sue together as plaintiffs in contract or tort, the codes
provide that, as in equity formerly, "if the consent of anyone who
should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained he may
be made a defendant, the reason thereof being stated in the com-
plaint." 62 Some of the many situations in which this provision
is used are indicated in the footnote. 3
Nonjoinder. Many of the codes specifically provide that a
special demurrer shotild be used to raise the objection of a non-
joinder of plaintiffs, when such defect is apparent on the rec-
ord.5 4 No distinction is taken between tort and contract actions
as at common law. The code decisions indicate a uniform hold-
ing that the objection will be waived if the special demurrer is
not used in this situation.55 If the nonjoinder is not apparent
52 See statutes cited supra note 48; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5640.
53 Hall v. So. Pac. Ry., 180 Pac. 20 (Cal. 1919) (employer, after paying
workmen's compensation award, refuses to join employee to sue third party
wrongdoers); Grain Dealers Ins. Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 98 Kan. 344,
157 Pac. 1187 (1916) (insured, after receiving insurance, refuses to join
with insurer in suing third party wrongdoer) ; Lashley v. Lashley, 212 Ala.
225, 102 So. 229 (1924) (one beneficiary refuses to join others in suit to en-
force trust); Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 231 Pac. 237 (Okla. 1924) (some of
legatees refuse to join others in suit to cancel deeds) ; Payne v. Melsser, 176
Wis. 432, 187 N. W. 194 (1922) (reversioner refuses to join in suit to
prevent life tenant from committing waste).
54 In the following codes, a provision is found that the defendant may
demur when it apears from the record that there is a defect of parties
plaintiff or defendant. Cal. C. C. P. (1923) § 430-1; Ga. Code (1926) §
5631; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 362; Iowa Code (1924) § 11130; Ky.
Civ. Ann. Code (Seymour, 1924) § 92; Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 9131; Nob.
Comp. Stat. (1922) § 8610; Nev. R. L. (1912) § 5040; N. M. Ann. Stat.
(1915) § 4110; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 7442; Ohio Gen. Ann. Code
(Page, 1926) § 11309; Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) §268; Or. Laws (1920) §
68; S. D. Rev. Code (1919) § 2348; S. C. C. C. P. (1922) § 401; Utah Comp.
Laws (1917) § 6568; Wash. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 259; Wis. Stat. (1921) §
2649; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 5651. And see, for statutes going oven
further in specifically adopting the old equity practice, infra note 57.
In the statutes here cited, "defect" is interpreted by a majority of the
courts to mean nonjoinder only. Rich v. Fry, 196 Ind. 303, 146 N. E. 393
(1925); Dolan v. Hubinger, 109 Iowa 408, 80 N. W. 514 (1899). Contra:
State v. Trimble, 262 S. W. 357 (Mo. 1924) (includes misjoinder).
55 Pulkrabek v. Bankers M't'ge Corp., 238 Pac. 347 (Or. 1925); State
v. Trimble, supra note 54. See Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1920) §§ 2566-7; Va.
Gen. Laws (1923) § 6118. The demurier must designate the parties to bo
joined. Rich v. Fry, supra note 54. Dilatory pleas such as this one are
very strictly construed against the person using them. Anderson v. East
Oregon Lumber Co., 106 Or. 459, 211 Pac. 937 (1923) (demurrer for "de-
fective parties plaintiff" held not sufficient as a demurrer for "defect of
parties plaintiff"). The New York practice requires that nonjoinder be
set up by motion. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 278, rules 102, 105.
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on the face of the record, it must be set up specially in the
answer, the omitted parties being designated.2
Some codes expressly provide that, as in equity formerly, a
plaintiff may amend if nonjoinder is proved* T And the courts
still have the power to refuse to proceed unless the complaint
is amended to bring in parties whose interests will be directly
affected by any decree that may be rendered.58 It is seldom,
therefore, that the plaintiff's action is dismissed because of a
defect of parties.4
Perrnissive joinder. A distinct departure from the common
law rules of joinder, based as they were on the distinction be-
tween joint and several interests, is seemingly found in the code
provision: "All persons having an interest in the subject of the
action and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as
plaintiffs." o This statement, it will be noticed, copies the
phraseology in which the former equity practice was usually
described. Furthemore, the framers of the original New York
Code, as is well known, stated that in general they meant to
apply equity procedure to all actions under the code.6' Unfor-
tunately, however, they used "and" instead of "or," thus making
6DMecCormack v. Bertschinger, 237 Pac. 363 (Or. 1925); Pye v. Eagle
Lake Lumber Co., 66 Cal. App. 584, 227 Pac. 193 (1924). In cases when
the defendant cannot know the names of all parties who are omitted, he
probably -would not be required to name them. See Travis v. First Nat'l
Bank, 210 Ala. 620, 98 So. 890 (1924) (not under code). In New York,
nonjoinder will be -waived if not raised by a preliminary motion. Porter
v. Lane Const. Corp., 212 App. Div. 528, 209 N. Y. Supp. 54 (4th Dept.
1925).
'5 The provision reads that no action shall be defeatc-l for nonjoinder
or misjoinder of plaintiffs or defendants. See, for example, Conn. Gen. Stat.
(1918) § 5646; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) § 4871; N. J. Comp. Stat. (Supp.
1924) § 163-285; N. Y. Cir. Prac. Act (1920) § 192; Va. Gen. Laws (1923)
§ 6102. See Aven v. Singleton, 132 Miss. 256, 96 So. 165 (1923).
z8 Fineman v. Cutler, supra note 50; Gooch v. Elliott, 113 S. E. 72 (S. C.
1922).
59 But see Wolfenbarger v. Britt, 105 Neb. 773, 181 N. W. 932 (1921)
(amendment not allowed).
60 Alaska Comp. Laws (1913) § 870; Ark. Dig. Stat (1921) § 1095; Cal.
C. C. P. (1923) § 378; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5640; Idaho Comp. Stat.
(1919) § 6645; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 270 ("shall be joincd");
Iowa Code (1924) § 10969; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 60-410; Ky. Civ. Ann.
Code (Seymour, 1924) § 22; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 1157; Mont. Rev. Code
(1921) § 9077; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 8535; Nev. R. L. (1912) § 4990;
N. M. Ann. Stat. (1915) § 4071; N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 455; N. D.
Comp. Laws (1913) § 7403; Ohio Gen. Ann. Code (Page, 1920) § 11254;
Okla. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 218; Or. C. C. P. (1920) § 393; Porto Rico R.
S. & Codes (1911) § 5046; S.C. C. C. P. (1922) § 360; S.D. Rev. Code (1919)
§ 2313; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) § 6506; Wis. Stat. (1921) § 2602; Wyo.
Comp. Stat. (1920) § 5592; U. S. Eq. Rules (1912) rule 37, U. S. Comp.
Stat. (1916) § 1536. For the more liberal statutes, see infra note 75.
61 FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMlISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEMINGS
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the requirement a double-barrelled one. In accordance with
familiar rules of interpretation, however, we would expect to
find that the code rule for permissive joinder had been interpre-
ted in the light of the equity decisions which had given it con-
tent. We would expect joinder to be allowed whenever the sub-
ject matter of the actions could, in the opinion of the court, be
settled in one action conveniently and without prejudice to the
defendant. But, at least in actions formerly triable at law, some
code courts have required that all the plaintiffs have an interest
in the whole subject of the action and in all the relief demanded,
disregarding the meaning which the code provisions had as-
sumed through interpretation.
The provision that all parties must be interested in the relief
demanded has proved the more severe restriction. Thus, when
obligees with separate interests in the same instrument attempt
to join in suing the obligor for a money judgment, there is a
misjoinder.6 2 Some code courts, however, realizing that a mul-
tiplicity of suits may be avoided without inconvenience at trial
or prejudice to the defendant, have allowed joinder in this situa-tion,63 stressing that a lump sum recovery is sought. When con-
tractees, under contracts which were separate but involved com-
mon questions of law or fact, have attempted to join in suing
the obligor, a misjoinder has been declared." As at common law,
if the interests of the plaintiffs in a contract are interpreted as
joint or several, joinder is allowed.08
When owners of separate interests in the same land have been
injured by a single tortious act of the defendant and join to
recover damages,66 or possession, 67 many code courts allow re-
covery. Clearly, no one plaintiff is interested in the relief de-
manded any more than in the contract cases just noted. Though
the case would not often arise, it would seem that the same
result should be reached when owners of separate interests in
62 Keary v. Mutual Reserve Ass'n, 30 Fed. 359 (E. D. Mo. 1887) ; Good-
night v. Goar, 30 Ind. 418 (1868).
03 Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. 325 (N. Y. 1853); Rizer v. Callen, 27 Kan.
339 (1882). Sureties on the same instrument are allowed to sue together for
reimbursement. Hudson v. Aman, 158 N. C. 429, 74 S. E. 97 (1912); see
Lord & Taylor v. Yale Mfg. Co. 230 N. Y. 132, 141, 129 N. E. 346, 348
(1920).
64 Ballew Lumber Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 288 Mo. 473, 232 S. AV. 1015
(1921).
65 See Chrage v. Hutt, 252 S. W. 658 (Mo. 1923).
66 Schiffer v. Eau Claire, 51 Wis. 385 (1881); Clark v. McClain Fire
Brick Co., 100 Ohio St. 110, 125 N. E. 877 (1919) (damages and injunc-
tion); Shepard v. Manhattan Ry., 117 N. Y. 442, 23 N. B. 30 (1889)
(same).
67 See Hunt v. Mounts, supra note 50. If the defendant files a special
demurrer, he can require the plaintiff to bring in other co-tenants. Shelby
v. Shelby, supra note 50.
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a chattel 6s sue together for injury to it caused by the defendant's
act.
Joinder is not allowed, in a suit for damages, when the de-
fendant's single act injures lands of which the plaintiffs each
own separate parcels r or chattels owned separately by those
who are attempting to join. 0 If an injunction is sought in such
a case, however, the courts will allow joinder71 Likevise it is
permitted when a number of persons who have bought stock l-
or land 73 sue together to be put in statu quo. A few courts will
allow the plaintiffs to recover damages in these misrepresenta-
tion cases,"' obviously in acordance with the meaning of the code
joinder provision as interpreted by courts of equity at the time
the early codes were adopted.
Misjoinder. It is expressly stated in some of the codes that
the proper way to object to a misjoinder of plaintiffs that ap-
pears on the record is by a special demurrer.5 If it is not used
the objection is waived.76 If no express provision is made in the
code, it is usual to follow the equity rule which also required
a special demurrer."7 If the misjoinder does not appear of rec-
ord, the code courts universally follow the equity practice of
requiring a plea in abatement.78 When a misjoinder is declared,
a number of the codes specify that the plaintiff shall be allowed
to amend.7 Presumably, in the absence of such a provision the
68 Contra: St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Dickerson, 29 Okla. ,380, 11S Pac. 140
(1911).
69 Hellams v. Switzer, 24 S. C. 39 (1885); Tate v. Ohio & MI. Ry., 10 Ind.
174 (1858); Burghen v. Erie Ry., 123 App. Div. 201, 103 N. Y. Supp. 311
(4th Dept. 1908).
70 Bort v. Yaw, 46 Iowa 323 (1877); Taylor v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 287
(1915).
7 Krocker v. Westmoreland Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 Atl. 669 (1922);
Younkin v. Milwaukee L. H. & T. Co., 112 Wis. 15, S7 N. W. 861 (1Q01).
72 Spencer v. McGuffin, 190 Ind. 308, 130 N. E. 407 (1921); Ellsworth
v. Trinkle, 96 Kan. 666, 153 Pac. 543 (1915).
73 Grover v. Marott, 192 Ind. 551, 136 N. E. 81 (1922) (damages allowed).
7 Supra note 73.
75 The statutes (cited supra note 54) also provide that a special demurrer
shall raise the question of misjoinder of parties in the following statcz:
California, Georgia, Montana, New Jersey, Utah. See also Fla. Rev. Gen.
Stat. (1920) §§ 2566-7; Miss. Ann. Code (Hem. 1917) § 359.
76 Frost v. Long & Co., 213 Pac. 1107 (TMont. 1923) ; Linder v. Wiimberly,
158 Ga. 285, 123 S. E. 129 (1924).
77 Parker v. McGinty, 77 Colo. 458, 239 Pac. 10 (1925); Billy v. McGill,
240 Pac. 119 (Okla. 1925). Under New York practice (Civ. Prac. Act. §
278, rules 102, 105) motions are substituted for demurcrz, and the notion
must be made before trial. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 211 App.
Div. 132, 207 N. Y. Supp. 574 (3d Dept. 1925).
7 Forbes v. Jamestown, 212 App. Div. "32, 209 N. Y. Supp. 99 (4th Dept.
1925) (too late after verdict); Hunt v. Mounts, e*T i,, note 00, (192G) 3
W. VA. L. Q. 101 (waived by failure to plead in abatement).
79 Supra note 57.
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code courts would reach the same result, following the equity
practice.
JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS-LATER CODE PROVISIONS
In the previous section it was pointed out that because of the
restricted meaning given them by the court the original code
provisions as to joinder largely failed of their purpose in mak-
ing the liberal equity rules applicable to all actions. The provi-
sions were especially defective in two regards. As in the case
of the code generally, they are couched in terms of absolute
declaration and restriction rather than as general directions
to guide but not to bind the court in the exercise of its discretion.
And they contained the troublesome requirement of an "interest
in obtaining the relief demanded" in all the plaintiffs. Following
the English precedents, a few jurisdictions have recently adopted
provisions which should largely, perhaps entirely, do away with
those difficulties. The New York provision reads as follows:
"All persons may be joined as plaintiffs in one action in whom
any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same tran-
saction or series of transactions is alleged to exist whether
jointly, severally or in the alternative, where if such persons
brought separate actions any common question of law or fact
would arise." 1o Discretion is given to the trial judge to order
separate trials whenever he believes that joinder would embar
rass or delay the trial. I"
so N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1920) § 209. The provision regarding alternative
joinder is discussed below. The English rule, Order 16, Rule 1, is prac-
tically identical. See infra note 84.
The New Jersey provisions reads: "Subject to rules, all persons claiming
an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the judgment de-
manded either jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may join as plaintiffs,
except as otherwise herein provided. And persons interested in separate
causes of action may join if the causes of action have a common question
of law or fact and arose out of the same transaction or series of transac-
tions." N. J. P. L. (1912) p. 378, § 4. Cf. definition of "transaction" in
the rules. N. J. P. L. (1912) p. 386, r. 13.
The Washington statute reads: "All persons interested in the cause of
action or necessary to the complete determination of the questions involved,
shall unless otherwise provided by law, be joined as plaintiffs when their
interest is in common with the party making the complaint, and as defend-
ants when their interest is adverse to the plaintiff." Wash. Comp. Stat.
(Rem. 1922) § 189. In Arkansas the statute authorizing consolidation of
suits has been used to secure more extensive joinder of parties. Ark. Dig.
Stat. (1921) § 1081; Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, 116 Ark, 334,
172 S. W. 885 (1915).
81 The New York and English statutes, supra note 80, conclude: " .
provided that if upon the application of any party it shall appear that such
joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the court may order
separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient, and judgment
may be given fbr such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found en-
titled to relief, for the relief to which he or they may be entitled."
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Under these provisions, a large number of persons who were
defrauded into buying worthless stock by acts of the defendant
were allowed to join and each recover damages, the court stat-
ing that the common questions of law or fact in such a case
were of the requisite "substantial importance as compared with
all the issues." 82 Pure tort claims for damages to each of sev-
eral plaintiffs whose property was injured in an explosion for
which the defendant was responsible were allowed in a single
action. 83  Other decisions of this general nature indicate that
the new rules, at least so far as these particular ones applying
to parties plaintiff are concerned, are being liberally and reason-
ably interpreted. In each case the question is made to turn on
the very practical question whether any common question of law
oi fact will arise in it.- It is to be expected that other juris-
dictions will adopt similar rules.
JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS--BEFORE THE CODES
Compulsory joinder at common lawv. In contract. Joint ob-
ligors had to be sued together in the law courts.Y To alleviate
82 Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924), (1925) 34
YALE LAW JOURNAL 192; cf. also Drincqbier v. Wood [1899] 1 Ch. 393.
83 Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 94 N. J. L. 230, 109 Ati.
742 (1920).
84 Cf. Akeley v. Kinnicutt, supra note 82: "The common issues are basic,
and would seem to be the ones around which must revolve the greatest
struggle, and to which must be directed the greatest amount of evidence."
See also Peacock v. Tata Sons, 206 App. Div. 145, 200 N. Y. Supp. 056
(1st Dept. 1923); Fleitmann & Co., Inc., v. Colonial Finance Corp., 203
App. Div. 827, 197 N. Y. Supp. 125 (1st Dept. 1922) (joinder allowed in
a suit for the conversion of gloves by A and B, each severally owning a
part, and C having a lien on the remainder); (1923) 32 Y AL LAW Joun-
NALY 384; (1924) 33 ibid. 817; (1925) 35 ibid. 84; (1921) 21 COL. L. Ilcv.
113; Sunderland, Joinder of Actions (1919) 18 MiCa. L. REV. 571. The
provision should be considered with reference to the joinder of defendants
provision discussed below. Joinder of parties in the alternative is also
discussed below. In England the rule originally did not contain the "same
transaction" phrase and the clause as to any common question of law or
fact. It was finally held by the House of Lords, after much conflict below,
that the rule did not relate to joinder of causes. Smurthwaite v. Hannay
[1894] A. C. 494. This so greatly restricted the operation of the rule that
it was expanded to its present form in 1896, and the courts have held that
thereby the rules were extended. Payne v. British Time Recorder Co.
[1921] 2 K. B. 1; Thames v. Moore [1918] 1 K. B. 555; Univerzities of Ox-
ford and Cambridge v. Gill [1899] 1 Ch. 55; Bedford v. Ellis [1901] A. C.
1. It is unfortunate that in New York this experience was not appreciated,
and that the joinder of causes restrictions have been continued with already
unfortunate results.
85 Keller v. Blasdell,'l Nev. 491 (1865); People v. Sloper, 1 Idaho 153
(1867); Needham v. Heath, 17 Vt. 223 (1845); see Scott v. Godwin, 1 Bos.
& P. 67, 73 (1797). In the case of executors, the plaintiff had to bue all
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,ome of the hardships that resulted from this technical rule,
some exceptions were allowed however. When one of the joint
obligors was out of the jurisdiction, the plaintiff could "outlaw"
him and proceed against the others jointly 5  Also, when one
joint obliger was discharged by opeiation of law after the con-
tract had been made, the plaintiff could sue all the obligors but
discontinue the suit as to the defendant discharged." If one of
the defendants could not be sued for some reason such as infancy
existing at the time the contract was made, the usual procedure
was to sue only the remaining obligors.8 And, finally, if the
plaintiff reasonably did not know before suit that the joint ob-
ligors had a dormant partner, the defendants sued could not
plead nonjoinder even in abatement. 9 When one of several
joint contractors died, the plaintiff was obliged to sue only the
survivor or survivors.90
In the so-called quasi-contractual actions, the rules as to con-
tract actions applied whenever the plaintiff had to rely on a
contract to prove his case, and, accordingly, all joint contractors
in these cases had to be joined as defendants.91
In tort. While, as will be noticed later,92 the plaintiff had his
option of suing joint tortfeasors jointly or severally, there was
one case in which defendants in tort actions had to be joined;
where joint tenants or tenants in common were sued for omit-
ting to do an act which, as such tenants and not otherwise, they
who proved the will. Hensloe's Case, 9 Co. 36b (42 Eliz.). See also Burdick,
Joint and Several Liability of Partners (1911) 11 CoL. L. REV. 101.86 Sheppard v. Baillie, 6 Term R. 327 (1795). The same result was
reached in almost all the states in this country, although outlawry did not
exist here. The usual substitute was a return of non est invcntua. Dennett
v. Chick, 2 Me. 191 (1823). Contra: McCall v. Price, 1 McC. L. 82 (S. C.
1821).
8 Boville v. Wood, 2 M. & S. 23 (1813) (bankruptcy); Noke v. Ingham,
1 Wils. 89 (1745) (same); Ivey v. Gamble, 7 Port. 545 (Ala. 1838) (statuto
of limitations). But see Belden v. Curtis, 48 Conn. 32 (1880).88 Burgess v. Merrill, 4 Taunt. 468 (1812); Gibbs v. Merrill, 3 Taunt.
307 (1810). If the plaintiff sued all the original obligors including the in-
fant, the practice varied. In England, he could not discontinue the action
as to the infant and proceed against the others. Boyle v. Webster, 17 Q. B
950 (1852). The opposite result was generally reached in this country
See, for example, Hartness v. Thomson, 5 Johns. 160 (N. Y. 1809).
89 Tomlinson v. Spencer, 5 Cal. 291 (1855) ; N. Y. Dry Dock Co. v. Tread.
well, 19 Wend. 525 (N. Y. 1838) (could not plead in abatement if plaintiff
did not know about the dormant partner at the time the contract was made)
See generally, Burdick, op. cit. supra note 85.
90i Murphy v. Branch Bank, 5 Ala. 421 (1843); Weaver v. Shryock, 4
Serg. & R. 262 (Pa. 1820); Executor's Action, 4 Leon. 193 (31 Eliz.). By
the weight of authority, the death of the obligor who was not joined had tv
be averred in the declaration. Blackwell v. Ashton, Sty. 50 (23 Car.).
91 Buddle v. Willson, supra note 1; Walcott v. Canfield, 3 Conn. 194
(1819).
92 See infra note 106.
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should have performed. As the common title had to be proved,
it was thought necessary to have all the tenants before the
coUrtY3
When one joint tortfeasor died, the plaintiff could sue the sur-
vivors jointly, but he could not join with them the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased wrongdoer even if the tort were one for
which an action would have survived as against that representa-
tive alone. 4
Nonjoinder. From early times at law, in a suit on a bond
where the defect was not apparent on the face of the record, the
plaintiff had to raise the question of nonjoinder of defendants
in abatement or else he waived the pointV5 The rule was later
extended to all contract actions in which the defect of defend-
ants was not apparent.00 The plea in abatement had to show
that the co-contractor was alive and could be sued.0 If the de-
fect appeared in the pleadings, the majority rule was to allow
it to be raised by a general demurrer, or in error or arrest of
judgment28 In tort cases, since the plaintiff had his option of
suing joint tortfeasors jointly or separately, the question of non-
joinder was not important.95 In the limited class of actions in
which the suit was against joint tenants or tenants in common
for a joint tort, however, a plea in abatement effectively raised
the question of nonjoinder 00
Permissive joinder at common kIw. In contract. Should the
contract on which the plaintiff sued be interpreted by the court
as joint and several, the plaintiff had his option of suing the
obligors alone or together.'0' He could not sue more than one,
93Low v. Mumford, 14 Johns. 426 (N. Y. 1817). The same evidently vas
true of co-parceners. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING (1824) 72.
94Johnson v. Cunningham, 56 Ill. App. 593 (1894); see Union Bank: v.
Mott, 27 N. Y. 633 (1863).
gr Cabell v. Vaughn, 1 Saund. 291 (21 Car. II) (with extensive note).
96 Rice v. Shute, 5 Burr, 2611 (10 Geo. III); Allen v. Luchet, 3 T. J.
Marsh. 164 (Ky. 1830); First Nat'l Bank v. Hamor, 49 Fed. 45 (C. C. A.
9th, 1892); Mountstephen v. Brooke, 1 Barn. & Ad. 224 (1818). The rule
was the same in joint and several contracts. See 1 Saund. 291, n. 2; blinor
v. Mechanics Bank, 1 Pet. 46 (U. S. 1828). And in the quasi-contract cases
where the plaintiff had to rely on the contract to prove his case. See Bud-
dle v. Willson, supra note 1.97 Ascue v. Hollingsworth, Cro. Eliz. 544 (39 Eliz.). But in the case of
matters of record such as recognizances and judgments, it need only appear
that there -was another obligor. Needham v. Heath, aupra note 85; Gilmas
v. Rives, 10 Pet. 298 (U. S. 1836).9s Harwood v. Roberts, 5 Greenl. 441 (Ale. 1828); King v. Young, 2
Anst. 448 (34 Geo. III); Wisner v. Catherwood, 225 Ill. App. 471 (1922).
99 Nonjoinder could not be pleaded. Fisher v. Cook, 23 Ill. App. 621
(1887); Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290 (N. Y. 1806); Mitchell v. Tar-
butt, 5 Term R. 649 (1794) (quasi-contract).
10 Low v. Mumford, 14 Johns. 426 (N. Y. 1817).
101 Poullain v. Brown, 80 Ga. 27 (1887) (sued one only); Lilly v. Hodges,
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though, unless he did join them all.1"2 And if one of such obli-
gors died, the plaintiff could treat the contract as several and
sue the personal representative of the deceased contractor, or
as joint and sue the surviving obligor or obligors 0 3
As might be expected, the plaintiff could not joint obligors
on several contracts,10 4 nor could he join obligors whose promises
appeared on the same instrument if the court interpreted the
promises as several. 0 5
In tort. The law courts broke away from the distinction be-
tween joint and several interests in their rules as to joinder of
defendants in tort actions. As a result, a plaintiff could sue joint
tortfeasors jointly or severally as he saw fit.00 Included within
the category of joint tortfeasors, under the American cases, for
the purpose of joinder at least, were persons whose independent
but concurrent acts caused a single injury to the plaintiff. A
typical case of such concurrent action was the situation where
two defendants, each driving negligently, collided and injured the
plaintiff.07
8 Mod. 166 (9 Geo. I) (same); Greer v. Miller, 2 Overt. 187 (Tenn. 1812)
(sued them jointly); see Maiden v. Webster, 30 Ind. 317 (1868).
102 Claremont Bank v. Wood, 12 Vt. 252 (1840). And, of course, if the
plaintiff started out on the theory that the contract was several, and sued
one obligor, he could not later join all the other obligors in a single suit.
Bangor Bank v. Treat, 6 Me. 207 (1829). Or, if the plaintiff sued all the
obligors on the theory that the contract was joint, he could not take a judg-
ment against one of them alone. Gibbons v. Surber, 4 Blackf. 155 (Ind.
1836). If the contract was treated as joint, the exceptions noted above with
regard to joint contracts applied.
103 May v. Hanson, 6 Cal. 642 (1856) (could not sue them to together);
Eggleston v. Buck, 31 Ill. 254 (1863) (same). In Enys v. Donnithorne, 2
Burr. 1190 (1761), the plaintiff sued only the personal representative. In
Lanier v. Irvine, 24 Minn. 116 (1877), the plaintiff sued only the surviving
obligors.
104 Mann v. Sutton, 4 Rand. 253 (Va. 1826); Register v. Casperson, 3
Harr. 289 (Del. 1844); Addicken v. Schrubbe, 45 Iowa 315 (1876); see
Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Clark, 272 S. W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
105 Gibson v. Lupton, 9 Bing. 297 (1832). As the contract of each surety
with the other sureties was considered several, a surety who was seeking
contribution at law had to sue each co-surety separately and recovered only
that surety's proportionate amount. Browne v. Lee, 6 Barn. & C. 689
(1827) ; Easterly v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 433 (1876).106 Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29 (1815) ; Vary v. Burlington Ry., 42 Iowa
246 (1875). If he obtained a judgment against one tortfeasor alone and
satisfied it, he could not later sue another one of the wrongdoers although
he later found he could have proved more damages in the first suit. West-
brook v. Mize, 35 Ran. 299 (1886).207 Foley v. Lord, 232 Mass. 368, 122 N. E. 393 (1919); Colegrove v.
New York & N. H. Ry., 20 N. Y. 492 (1859); Ilauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa.
128 (1860) (joint owfiers of wall negligently allowed it to deteriorate and
fall); Consolidated Ice Machine Co. v. Kiefer, 26 Ill. App. 466 (1887)
(successive negligence of two defendants co-operating to build a structure);
Sharon v. Anahma Realty Corp., 123 Atl. 192 (Vt. 1924). For the English
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If a servant, in the course of his employment, committed a tort
for which the master would have been responsible (if sued alone)
only under the doctrine of respondeat superior, there was a doubt
whether the master and servant could be joined in the action
for damages. Mlost cases seemed to refuse joinder.2 3 A similar
question arose in the analogous principal-agent cases, where the
agent injured the third person 1 9 Of course, if the master or
principal directed the commission of the tort, the plaintiff could
at his option, always join him with the servant or agent.-,
Whenever the court interpreted the acts of the wrongdoers as"separate," no joinder was allowed211 Within this rule, a plain-
tiff who was slandered at the same time by two people could not
join them.112 And when two people each converted the plaintiff's
goods by unconnected acts, it seems that joinder was not al-
lowed.113
Misjoinder. The law courts nonsuited the plaintiff in a con-
tract action if the misjoinder did not appear in the pleadings,
unless he proved the contract as he pleaded it.114 If the mis-
joinder appeared in a contract aation, the rule was also stringent
and the defendant could raise the point by a general demurrer.115
A tort action, however, was not defeated by misjoinder except
as to those against whom no cause of action was proved. Thus,
if a plaintiff alleged a joint tort by several defendants who were
joined, and he proved that the act was committed by only some
view, see The Koursk [1924] P. 140, 40 T. L. R. 399; (1925) 34 YAL
LAw JoURNAL 335; (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 891; 2 CArmnUGc L. 3. 24:3; and
for the decision below, see [1923] P. 206; (1924) 37 HXv. L. REv. 619;
(1924) 36 JURm. REV. 178; (1924) 40 L. Q. REv. 384. See alzo Little
Schuylkill Co. v. Richard's Adm'r, 57 Pa. 142 (1868); (1920) 9 A. L. Ri.
940 annotation; 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 669 (1908) annotation; (1927) 27 COL.
L. REv. 754. Cf. Ader v. Blau, a recent New York case discussed infra note
163.208 Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592 (Mass. 1850) ; Davis v. Groner, 121
Atl. 446 (N. J. 1923) ; The Koursk, svpra note 107; McNamara v. Chapman,
123 Atl. 229 (N. H. 1923); Bartlett v. Sullivan, 249 Ill. App. 410 (1927),
21 ILL. L. R.v. 522; cf. (1917) 30 HARv. L. REV. 525. See Michael v. Alez-
tree, 2 Lev. 172 (28 Car. II); Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337 (176). For
cases under the code, see infra notes 144, 145.
.09 The Jungshoved, 290 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); (1924) 22 Micu.
L. Rnv. 255. Cf. Moreton v. Hardern, 4 Barn. & C. 223 (1825). For cases
under the code, see inf( a note 144.: 0 Hawkesworth v. Thompson, 98 Blass. 77 (1867) ; Mloore v. Fitchburg
Ry., 4 Gray 465 (Mlass. 1855) (master gave standing instructions).
111 See Dickey v. Willis, 215 Mlass. 292, 102 N. E. 336 (1913).
11 Chamberlain v. White, Cro. Jac. 647 (20 Jac. I).
113 See Nicoll v. Glennie, 1 M. & S. 588 (1813).
114 Livingston's Ex'rs v. Tremper, 11 Johns. 101 (N. Y. 1814); Shirreff
v. Wilks, 1 East 48 (1800); Kimmel v. Schultz, 1 Ill. 169 (1826).
115 State Treasurer v. Friott, 24 Vt. 134 (1852); Wooster v. Northrup,
5 Wis. 245 (1856). It is usually stated also that the objection might be
raised in error or in arrest. Cunningham v. Orange, 52 Atl. 269 (Vt. 1902).
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of them, the action was merely dismissed as to those not im-
plicated.11-
Joinder in equity. None of the artificiality of the common law
joinder rules appeared in chancery practice. The equity rule
that all parties had to be joined if the transaction could not be
settled without directly affecting their interest has already been
discussed. 11 It was also noted above, that any abrupt division
between plaintiffs and defendants in equity would be unreal be-
cause the plaintiff could joint as defendants those who would
not or could not join as plaintiffs and should ordinarily have been
so classed.1 8 That discussion indicates that the statement "all
parties should be interested in the subject of the action and in
the relief demanded," did not lay down a rigid requirement for
every case but was merely the phraseology used to describe a
system built around an ideal of convenient trial practice, with
considerable flexibility to meet new situations. This view is
further strengthened by the cases involving permissive joinder
of defendants. For example, a plaintiff who was justifiably in
doubt as to the facts could joint two sets of sureties as defend-
ants, the one of whom was responsible for the acts of a common
principal up to a certain date and the other after that date.
This was true although proof at the trial would very likely show
that only one of the defendant owed the plaintiff.19 A plaintiff
could join as defendants, in a suit to recover a trust fund, all in
whose hands portions of the fund had come.1 20 In a suit to quiet
title, he could sue all who made adverse claims to the property." 1
If the plaintiff sued to set aside fraudulent conveyances of land,
he could join all who claimed portions or interests in it, although
their interests had been received at different times through con-
veyances entirely separate. 22
JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS--UNDER THE CODES
Compulsory joinder. The code provision requiring joinder of
all parties united in interest has already been noted in connec-
116 Swigert v. Graham, 7 B. Mon. 661 (Ky. 1847); Keer v. Oliver, 61
N. J. L. 154 (1897); Subley v. Mott, 1 Wils. 210 (1747). In the exceptional
case of slander or conversion where the tort was regarded as "several,"
the objection to misjoinder had to be raised before verdict if the verdict
was against one defendant only. Burcher v. Orchard, Sty. 349 (1652).
But not when a judgment against all of the defendants was given. Nicoll
v. Glennie, supra note 113.
117 See supra notes 19-28.
18 See supra notes 24-27.
119 State v. Brown, 58 Miss. 835 (1881). See also cases infra note 169.
120 Blake v. Van Tilborg, 21 Wis. 672 (1867).
121 Carlson v. Curren, 48 Wash. 249, 93 Pac. 315 (1908).
1 22 Hultberg v. Anderson, 170 Fed: 657 (D. Kan. 1909); Bauknight v.
Sloan, 17 Fla. 284 (1879).
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tion with joinder of plaintiffs. 12 3 In its application to joinder
of defendants, it has resulted in no substantial change from the
previous systems. Thus, except as changed by special statutes,
all joint contractors must be joined in a suit to recover damages
for breach of the contract.124 Special statutes modifying to a
considerable extent the common law rule or providing that joint
cont-actors may be sued as are several contractors are, however,
quite general.- = The former "indispensable" parties of equity
must still be joined,120 while the "necessary" parties must be
joinded except in certain cases where they cannot be practicably
brought before the court. 27  Under most codes the defendant
may enter a special demurrer for a defect of defendants, when
that defect appears in the pleadings.126 If he does not do so, the
nonjoinder is waived.121 If the defect does not appear in the
pleadings, the defendant must answer in abatement."-" In gen-
eral, the plaintiff may amend to supply the defect of parties 3'
Permissive joi-nder. The general code provision is that "Any
person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest
in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff or who is a necessary
See, as to joinder of defendants generally, Creager v. Beamer Synd., 274
S. W. 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Ferguson v. Mansfield, 114 Tex. 112, 263
S. W. 894 (1924); Stewart v. Miller, 271 S. W. 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
23 See supra note 48.
124 Wolfenbarger v. Britt, supra note 59; Camp v. Grez, 250 U. S. "03,
39 Sup. Ct. 478 (1918); Delaware Co. Nat'l. Bank v. King, 109 App. Div.
553, 95 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1st Dept. 1905); Slutts v. Chafee, 4S Wis. 617
(1880).
15 See statutes discussed in Burdick, op. cit. supra note 85; ef. also,
(1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 771; (1922) 32 YALE LAW JounN,%L 290.
126 Egyptian Novaculite Co. v. Stevenson, 8 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925), quoting Shields v. Barrow, supra note 20; see supra note 21; Castle
v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. 156 (1902); Mahr v. Norwich
Union Fire Ins. Soc., 127 N. Y. 452, 25 N. E. 391 (1891) (a somewhat harsh
decision).
27 Pacific Southwest Trust Co. v. Mayer, 244 Pac. 248 (Wash. 192);
O'Connell v. Ryan, 127 Misc. 350, 216 N. Y. Supp. 590 (Mun. Ct. 192);
Grazioso v. Hirschfield, 128 Atl. 541 (N. J. 1925); Stephen v. Howells
Sales Co., 16 F. (2d) 805 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); Davis & Holmes Land Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank, supra note 50; Am. Smelting & Ref'g Co. v. Hicks, 65
Colo. 146, 172 Pac. 1055 (1918).
128 See statutes cited supra note 54.
129 Crowley v. Calhoun, 161 Ga. 354, 130 S. E. 563 (1925) ; Wilson & Co.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 300 Mo. 1, 254 S. W. 200 (1923).
130 Berringer v. Krueger, 69 Cal. App. 711, 232 Pac. 407 (1924) ; Gandia
v. Porto Rico Fertilizer Co., 291 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923), certiorari
denied, 44 Sup. Ct. 37; Lapayowker v. Levitzky, 130 Atl. 627 (N. J. 1925)
(without code provision). Dickenson v. Hawes, 32 Ga. App. 173, 122 S. E.
811 (1924), again illustrates the disfavor with which the courts lool: on
these dilatory pleas.
133- See statutes supra note 57; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hyde, 204 Pac.
125 (Okla. 1922).
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party to the complete determination or settlement of the ques-
tion involved herein." 132 This would seem sufficiently broad to
enable the courts to carry out the purpose of the code makers
to adopt for all actions the equity rules which had for their ob-
ject the complete settlement of a question or transaction in
a single suit. 3 3 But many of the decisions indicate comparatively
little advance over the common law rules. Among reasons in
addition to the natural conservatism of courts, two may be par-
ticularly noted. One is the effect of the restricted rules of
joinder of plaintiffs which were discussed above. The English
experience shows that a liberalization of the rules of plaintiff
joinder leads to a corresponding extension of the rules of defend-
ant joinder.13 It seems that the possible scope of a single case
seems more or less delimited by the extent of the rules within
which plaintiffs may be joined; and courts naturally fall into
the practice of setting a limit to the joinder of defendants cor-
responding roughly to that set for plaintiffs. And the other is
the effect of the restrictions on joining causes of action. These
on their face seem to conflict with the joinder of parties rule,
for they typically provide that each cause of action must affect
all parties to the action.135 It is true that if the term "cause of
action" is not construed in a restrictive sense, the difficulty may
be largely avoided, but many courts unfortunately have con-
sidered "cause of action" as identical with "right of action." "
Thus in the cases of principal and guarantor noted below, there
has been thought to be two causes of action. Such an interpre-
tation of the codes results in continuing in large measure the
132Alaska Comp. Laws (1913) § 870; Ark. Dig. Stat. (1921) § 1096;
Cal. C. C. P. (1923) § 379; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5641; Idaho Comp.
Stat. (1919) § 6646; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 276; Iowa Code
(1924) § 10972; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 60-411; Ky. Civ. Ann. Code
(Seymour, 1924) § 23; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919). § 1158; Mont. Rev. Code
(1921) § 9078; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 8541; Nev. R. L. (1912) § 4999;
N. M. Ann. Stat. (1915) § 4072; N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 456; N. D.
Comp. Laws (1913) § 7404; Ohio Gen. Ann. Code (Page, 1926) § 11255;
Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) § 219; Or. C. C. P. (1920) §393; Porto Rico
R. S. & Codes (1911) § 5047; S. C. C. C. P. (1922) § 361; S. D. Rev. Code
(1919) § 2314; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) § 6507; Wis. Stat. (1921) §
2603; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 5593. Federal Equity Rules (1912) §
37, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1536, has practically the same provisions.
And see the Washington statute supra note 80. The more liberal statutes
on the subject are collected infra note 158.
233 Fi sr RE . N. Y. COiM'RS PL. & PR. (1848) 124; Clark, The Code
Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 817.
134 Referred to supra note 84.
13 Clark, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action (1927) 25 Micii. L,
REv. 395, 401.
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common law distinction between joint and several interests as
the arbitrary test of permissive joinder of defendants.1 3
In tort cases, also, some code courts still tend to follow the
common law rules. Universally the plaintiff has his option of
suing tortfeasors, who are joint tortfeasors in the strict sense
that they acted in concert, together or separately.'r But further,
in this country at least, where the wrongful acts of two or more
persons, though independent, were concurrent and resulted in a
single injury to the plaintiff, such persons are considered joint
tortfeasors for the purpose of suit.'" Beyond this the courts
have differed as to where to draw the line. Various' cases may
be noted.
When the plaintiff's land is injured because of the separate
acts of the defendants in polluting a stream, or wrongfully build-
ing dams, joinder is usually allowed in a suit for injunctions
against each of them.4 0 A few courts, realizing that common
questions of law and fact are involved so that time will be saved
by joinder, allow the plaintiff to recover damages also in this
situation.141 When a plaintiff is injured by a defective sidewalk,
allowed to become dangerous due to the separate negligence of a
municipality and a private individual, he is permitted to join
both in a suit for damages. 4 2 And when the concurrent negli-
gence of two people causes a collision in which the plaintiff is
injured, he is allowed to join the wrongdoers.'4
136 See Clark, op. cit. supr note 133, at 328, 829, advocating a more
flexible definition of cause of action.
"-37 Cf. Phillips v. Flynn, 71 Mo. 424 (1880) ; Voorhis v. Childs' E:'r, 17
N. Y. 354 (1858).
" 31 Griswold v. Morrison, 53 Cal. App. 93, 200 Pac. 62 (1921) (sued
separately); Smith v. Mosbarger, 156 Pac. 79 (Ariz. 1910). See Myers
v. Linebarger, 134 Ark. 231, 203 S. W. 5SO (1918) (can be sued separately).
139 See supra note 107. As to contribution between joint tortfeazors see
Comment (1925) 34 Yux L.W JouRxAL 427. As to a case of joinder Vhere
it was impossible to tell which defendant was responsible, see Celver v.
Miles, 100 So. 666 (Mliss. 1927), noted in (1927) 3G YU LAW Jouniz.%
886.
140 Moses v. Morganton, 192 N. C. 102, 133 S. E. 421 (1926) (joinder
allowed, i. e., no removal to federal court where plaintiff does not desire
it and where one of defendants is in same state with plaintiff) ; (192G)
39 A. L. R. 939, collecting cases; Bunker Hill Mining Co. v. PolaR, 7 F.
(2d) 583 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), noted in (1925) 74 U. op P,. L. RE. 100.
In Seattle Taxi Motor Co. v. De Jarlais, 236 Pac. 785 (Wash. 1925), under
the Washington statute quoted supra note SO, an injunction was allowed
in a suit to enjoin unfair competition by various taxicab companie. See
Note (1926) 20 ILL. L. REv. 294.
'41 Mitchell Realty Co. v. West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N. W. 300 (1924),
(1925) 3 Wis. L. REV. 245; Bunker Hill Mining Co. v. Pola, oupr, note
140; Cloyes v. Middlebury Elec. Co., 80 Vt. 109, 66 AtI. 1039 (1907). Con-
tra: Tackaberry Co. v. Sioux City Service Co., 154 Iowa 358, 132 N. W.
945 (1911) ; (1920) 9 A. L. R. 939.
.4 2 Fortmeyer v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 11G Blinn. 158, 133 N. W. 4G1 (1911).
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A conflict exists as to whether, when a servant injures a plain-
tiff so that his master is responsible under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior only, the master and servant can be joined
in a single action for damages. The later cases seem to permit
such joinder, 44 although there are quite a number of jurisdic-
tions holding to the contrary.345
When a plaintiff's property has been taken from him fraud-
ulently, he is usually allowed to sue the original wrongdoers
and transferees in a single suit to get back his property.141 And
a trustee in bankruptcy can sue creditors who have received
preferences even though not all of the creditors are involved in
each preferential transfer. 47  These cases all indicate that in
spite of the broad wording of the code, the result of obtaining
the complete settlement of a question or controversy or related
questions in a single action has not been secured in many jur-
isdictions.
Same; Persons liable upon the same obligation or instrument.
The codes generally contain a further provision that persons
.43 See authorities supra note 107. For a slightly different fact situation
where joinder was allowed, see Daggy v. Miller, 180 Iowa 1146, 162 N. W.
854 (1917). Contra: White v. Arizona Eastern Ry., 229 Pac. 101 (Ariz.
1924).
44 Illinois Central Ry. v. Hawkins, 115 N. E. 613 (Ind. 1917); Green-
berg v. Whitcomb Lumber Co., 90 Wis. 225 (1895); Mayberry v. No. Pac0
Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 79, 110 N. W. 356 (1907); Burrichter v. Chicago, l. &
St. P. Ry., 10 F. (2d) 165 (D. Minn. 1925) (plaintiff can prevent removal
to federal court if one of defendants lives in same state with him) ; Hay
v. May Dep't Stores Co., 271 U. S. 318, 46 Sup. Ct. 498 (1926); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 12 F. (2d) 818 (C. A. D. C. 1926); Kraus v. C. B. &
Q. Ry., 16 F. (2d) 79 (1926); Allen v. Frester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N. W.
841 (1924); Davis v. Groner, 121 Atl. 446 (N. J. 1923); see Maumee Val-
ley Rys. v. Montgomery, 81 Ohio St. 426, 91 N. E. 181 (1910). A few
jurisdictions allow a verdict to stand against the master without a verdict
against the servant in this situation. See (1927) 36 YALE LAw JOURXAL
1026.
The same conflict arises in the analogous principal-agent cases. See, for
example, the cases collected in (1927) 46 A. L. R. 1506; Huffman v. Bankers
Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 277, 200 N. W. 994 (1924); (1925) 25 CoL. L. Rum. 504.
14 Hobbs v. Hurley, 104 Atl. 815 (Me. 1918); Scherrer v. Foster, 5 F.
(2d) 236 (E. D. Ill. 1925); Bartlett v. Sullivan, 241 Ill. App. 410 (1926);
French v. Cent. Construction Co., 76 Ohio St. 509, 81 N. E. 751, 12 L. R.
A. (N. s.) 669 (1907) annotation; B. & 0. Ry. v. Baillie, 148 N. E. 233
(Ohio, 1925).
'146 Fairfield v. Southport Nat'l Bank, 77 Conn. 423, 59 Atl. 513 (1904)
(joined transferees of promissory notes); Nichols v. Michael, 23 N. Y. 264
(1861) (chattels recovered from fraudulent vendee and his transferees);
Winslow v. Dousman, 18 Wis. 456 (1864) (joined transferees of land).
Contra: Warnock Uniform Co. v. Garifalos, 224 N. Y. 522, 121 N. B. 353
(1918) (attempted to joint fraudulent vendee of promissory notes and
eight transferees each holding separate notes).
1 Sherwood v. Holbrook, 98 Misc. 668, 163 N. Y. Supp. 326 (Sup. Ct.
1917).
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severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument may all
or any of them be included in the same action at the option of
the plaintiff. 14 In spite of this it is held that where two people
make separate contracts with the plaintiff covering the same
transaction or question, as principal and guarantor, there are
two causes of action and neither affects both defendants.149
On the other hand the contract of a technical surety is regarded
as joint and several with that of his principal.'1° The result is
to call for fine distinctions as to when there are separate con-
tracts and when only one. Whether these are two documents
is not controlling but seems practically to be quite important.1;
148 "Persons severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument,
including the parties to bills of exchange, promissory notes, may all or any
of them be included in the same action at the option of the plaintiff." This
is the usual phrasing of the code provision and will be found, though with
varied wording, in the following: Alaska Comp. Laws (1913) § 866; Ariz.
Rev. Stat. (1913) § 407; Ark. Dig. Stat. (1921) § 1099; Cal. C. C. P.
(1923), § 383; D. C. Ann. Code (1925) § 1211; Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919)
§ 6650; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 278; Iowa Code (1924) § 10975;
Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 60-414; Ky. Ann. Civ. Code (Seymour, 1924) §
26; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 231, § 4; Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 9174;
Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) § 1160; Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 90S4; Neb. Comp.
Stat. (1922) § 8544; Nev. R. L. (1912) § 5002; N. J. Comp. Stat. (1911)
p. 4060, § 29; N. M. Stat. Ann. (1915) § 4074; N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1920)
§ 2,6 (1); N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 458; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) §
7407; Ohio Gen. Ann. Code (Page, 1926) § 11258; Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921)
§ 222; Or. Laws (1920) § 37; Porto Rico R. S. & Codes (1911) § 5051;
R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) § 4869; S.C.C.C.P. (1922) § 363; S. D. Rev. Code
(1919) § 2316; Tenn. Code (Thompson's Shannon, 1918) § 4484; Utah
Comp. Laws (1917) § 6511; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Rem. 1922) § 192; Wis.
Stat. (1921) § 2609; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) § 5596; English Prac. Rulez,
o. 16, r. 6.
'149 Mowery v. Mast, 9 Neb. 445 (1880) (guarantor); Berdan v. Gilbert,
13 Wis. 670 (1861) (guarantor of collection); Graham v. Wingo, 67 Mo.
324 (1878); Wolf v. Eppenstein, 71 Or. 1, 140 Pac. 751 (1914); Bondward
v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 160 (1862); Allen v. Fosgate, 11 How. Pr. 213 (N. Y.
1855).
150 Carman v. Plass, 23 N. Y. 286 (1861) (joinder allowed) ; Lou-stalot Y.
Calkens, 120 Cal. 688, 52 Pac. 583 (1898). By the majority rule, an un-
disclosed principal whose identity has been discovered cannot be joined in
a suit on the contract as a defendant along with the agent. The Jung-
shoved, supra note 109, (1924) 22 MICH. L. REv. 255. Even in the case
of technical sureties on the same contract, the rules governing joinder of
causes of action may prevent joinder of the sureties. See Baher v. Hanson,
231 Pac. 902 (Mont. 1924) (plaintiff could not join surety A, who was re-
sponsible for the whole default, and surety B, who was responsible for part
only, as each cause of action must affect all parties to the suit).
The surety was sued alone against his objection in Posch v. Lion Bonding
Co., 137 Minn. 169, 163 N. W. 131 (1917); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Wood
Canal Co., 10 F. (2d) 501 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
151 Gf. Carman v. Plass, supra note 150 with the cases cited supra note
149.
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The difficulty has been avoided in the Connecticut and New Jer-
sey rules which by express provision include all such cases."5 2
Misjoinder. As noted above,153 a few courts have interpreted
the demurrer provision as to "defect of parties" as covering mis-
joinder, so that any objection thereto has to be raised by a spe-
cial demurrer if the misjoinder appears on the record. The
other code courts reach the same result, following the former
equity rule,154 and, of course, make no distinction between con-
tract and tort actions in this regard. If the misjoinder is not
apparent, an answer in abatement is required.' But, as in
equity, these rules are qualified to the extent that a defendant
cannot object to the joinder of other defendants if in the opinion
of the court he is not prejudiced by their presence.'", Here also,
either by specific provision requiring it, or by decision, the code
courts will usually allow the plaintiff to remedy a misjoinder of
defendants by amendment in accordance with the prior equity
practice. 57
JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS-LATER CODE PROVISIONS
In those jurisdictions which have recently adopted the more
extensive English provisions as to joinder of plaintiffs, there is
also a substantial extension of the rules of permissive joinder
of defendants. The New York provision reads: "All persons
may he joined as defendants against whom the right to any re-
lief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alter-
native; and judgment may be given against such one or more of
the defendants as may be found to be liable, according to their
respective liabilities." 11 Discretion, of course, is given the trial
court to order a severance." 9
152 These include "indorsers, guarantors, and sureties, whether on the
same or by a separate instrument" in the provision quoted supra note 148.
Conn. Prac. Book (1922) p. 277, § 154; N. J. P. L. (1912) 385, n. 7.
153Supra note 54.
154 Tice & Co. v. Evans, 32 Ga. App. 385, 123 S. E. 742 (1924) ; Schauer
v. Morgan, 216 Pac. 347 (Mont. 1923).
'55 G'enack v. German, 224 Mich. 79, 194 N. W. 575 (1923) (motion to
dismiss replaces plea in abatement); see Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v.
Swartz, 234 Pac. 1059 (Colo. 1925).
' 5 0 O'Connell v. Rogers, 237 Pac. 775 (Cal. 1925); Lowery Lock Co. v.
Wright, 154 Ga. 867, 115 S. E. 801 (1923). Even if a misjoinder of other
parties defendant is declared, the action would not be dismissed as to all
defendants. See Tuppela v. Mathison, 291 Fed. 728 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
'5 Statutes supra note 57; Stone v. Edwards, 32 Ga. App. 479, 124 S. H.
54 (1924). Contra: Hallen v. Smith, 264 S. W. 665 (Mo. 1924).
258 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1920) § 211. See also N. J. P. L. (1912) p.
378, § 6; Eng. o. 16, r. 4. The clause regarding joinder in the alternative
is discussed later.
'59 See N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1920) § 212.
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Under this provision there would seem to be no question but
that many of the cases noted in the previous section, where
joinder was refused, should be decided differently. In general
it may be stated that the tendency is towards such liberal deci-
sions.10  Unfortunately in New York, the rules governing join-
der of causes of action were not changed when this new provi-
sion as to parties was introduced. This was in spite of the
fact that the English experience had demonstrated the difficulty
of carrying out provisions for extensive joinder of palties unless
the rules as to joinder of causes were also broadly interpreted.c6
Lower court decisions in New York had, however, quite properly
given effect to the new party joinder provisions, 2 and with a
view of the term cause of action as is stated herein, little diffi-
culty might have followed. The New York Court of Appeals
has, however, now reverted once more to the narrow construc-
tion of the term and has decidedly limited the rules of party
joinder in the case of Ader v. Bla,.c3 Here the plaintiff sued for
the death of his intestate, claiming that the first defendant
had negligently maintained a picket fence upon which the in-
160 See Oesterreichische Export vorm. Janowitzer v. British Indemnity
Co. [1914] 2 K. B. 747 (plaintiff sued two insurance companies, each of
-whom had insured a portion of the same cargo); Bullock v. L. G. 0. Co.
[1907] 1 K. B. 264; Thomas v. Mloore [1918] 1 K. B. 555; also cases cited
infr c notes 162, 174-178.
1-61 See si:pra note 84, and discussion in (1923) 32 YAt= LAW JOU.In,'xAL
584. The Rhode Island cases illustrate strikingly how a narrow definition
of "cause of action" in the provisions regarding joinder of causes of action
may nullify the effect of the new rule for defendants. Bezharian v. Rhode
Island Co., 41 R. I. 94, 102 Atl. 807 (1918), (1918) 31 HLwv. L. IREv. 103.1;
McGinn v. Comstock & Son Co., 106 Atl. 222 (R. I. 1919); Lally v. VEn-
trone, 120 AtI. 161 (R. I. 1923). Cf. N. J. P. L. (1912) p. 378, § G. "The
plaintiff may join separate causes of action against several defendants if
the causes of action have a common question of law or fact and arose out
of the same transaction or series of transactions." This is similar to the
provision as to joining plaintiffs quoted svpra note 80.
162 Sherlock v. Mlanwaren, 208 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. 709 (4th
Dept. 1924); First Const. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 211 App. Div. 184, 206
N. Y. Supp. 822 (1st Dept. 1924); S. L. T. Co. v. Bockc, 118 Misc. 756, 191
N. Y. Supp. 773 (2nd Dept. 1922), (1923) 32 Y,= LAv, Journz,%L 031;
Cowles v. Eidlitz, 121 Mlisc. 340, 201 N. Y. Supp. 254 (Sup. Ct. 1923),
(1924) 24 COL. L. Rnv. 208; Mlende v. Mende, 218 App. Div. 791, 218 N. Y.
Supp. 283 (3d Dept. 1926). But see Klein v. Betzold, 119 Misc. 505, 197
N. Y. Supp. 501 (Sup. Ct. 1922), adversely criticized in Rothschild, Sbapli-
fication of Civil Practice in New York (1923) 23 COL. L. rxv. 018, 0GM.
163 241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771, 41 A. L. R. 1216 (1925). The case is
criticized by the writer in (1925) 35 YA=n LAW JoUUvNL 85; alo in (1925)
25 COL. L. REV. 975, and (1925) 11 CoRx. L. Q. 113. In (192G) 20 CoL. L.
REV. 30, Professor Rothschild, who was the successful counsel, argues that
the decision was a correct interpretation of the present statutes although
these should be changed. In (1926) 20 ILL. L. Rav. 533, Profcsszr Hinten
discusses the case as showing the breakdown of modern joinder rule-, a
conclusion which seems not wholly fair in view of the English experience.
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testate had been fatally injured, and that the second defendant, a
surgeon, had negligently treated the intestate, who was so in-
jured, that he died. It was held that the joinder was improper,
both from the standpoint of parties and of causes of action. The
decision so far as it concerns causes of action is considered
critically elsewhere.' " So far as the question of palties is con-
cerned it means that the rules as to joinder of causes must over-
ride all others, and since such rules are here most narrowly con-
strued, there is grave danger that the new party rules may be
nullified. In a very practical sense the question in the case was,
who was responsible for the intestate's death, and it would seem
to be a question to be properly determined in a single action16 5
In this case also the court, while denying that there was "any
common question of law or fact," also holds that joinder of de-
fendants, unlike joinder of plaintiffs, does not depend on the
existence of such common question. It is true that the statute
does not in terms state this test, but this holding, it is submitted,
presents a dilemma to the court, for the statute as to joining de-
fendants, quoted above, is less restricted in its provisions than
the plaintiff joinder statute. But the English experience seems
to indicate that substantially the same rules will in practice ap-
ply to joinder of both plaintiffs and defendants. The test of a
common question of law or fact affords a practical and under-
standable test, and should not, it is submitted, be discarded.'"
Whether these rules will modify the former rule that principal
and guarantor cannot be sued together is not clear. Unfortu-
nately, in New York the former statute providing for joining
persons severally and immediately liable on the same obligation
or instrument was retained. It may, therefore, be held that the
former restrictive construction of this statute still obtains107
164 The provision requiring joined causes to affect all parties to the ac-
tion has been removed from the New York act, but the court held that these
were separate causes, that they were inconsistent and that they did not
arise out of the same transaction.
165 It is not clear how far this case overturns such a case as Sherlock v.
Manwaren, supra note 162, where joinder was allowed in a suit against
four physicians for negligence in successively resetting the plaintiff's
shoulder bone. Possibly in the Ader case, had the action been expressly
stated to be in the alternative against the defendants, the court might
have upheld the joinder under the rules as to alternative joinder discussed
in the next section.
166 Cf. (1925) 35 YALE LAw JOURNAL 88, n. 11, and Sherlock v. Man-
waren, supra note 162. The extension of the rules of joinder of plaintiffs
in England in 1896 led in practice to an extension of the rules of joinder
of defendants. This development is traced in KING & BALL, TuE ANNUAL
PRAcTIce (1927) 201-2, 227-229; see also supra notes 84, 134; (1923) 32
YALE LAW JOURNAL 384; Rothschild, Simplification of Civil Practice (1924),
24 COL. L. REv. 730, 750-752. But see (1924) 24 COL. L. REy. 681.
167 See Medina, Some Phases of the New York Civil Practice Act and
Rules (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 113, 124.
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JOINDER IN THE ALTERNATIVE
Common law and code rules. At common law, it was settled,
in accordance with the rule discussed above that parties could
only be joined where their interests were joint, that parties
could not be joined in the alternative.21' Thus, where a public
officer engaged A as his sole surety for one year, and B as his
sole surety for the next year, and defaulted sometime during the
two-year period, even if it was impossible to tell during which
year he defaulted, the state could not sue A and B together. In
this particular situation, at least, equity would allow joinder of
of defendants in the alternative.lcO But, under the codes, it has
been generally held that in the absence of express statutes par-
ties could not be joined in the alternative, even though the plain-
tiff was put to more expense to settle the transaction, and might
even lose out altogether by the way the proof developed at the
separate trials. Thus in tort actions, while the common law and
code courts would allow a plaintiff to sue independent tortfeasors
together if their acts were concurrent and resulted in a single
injury to the plaintiff, it would not allow the plaintiff to plead,
more truthfully no doubt in many cases, that one or the other
of the defenaants had caused the injury, and ask for relief ac-
cordinglyY70
Statutory alternative joi4der-P '.intiffs. In New York and
New Jersey, joinder of plaintiffs in the alternative is permit-
ted.Y-' No cases have been decided by the highest court in
these jurisdictions which directly involved the point. A decision
by an intermediate New York court, with two judges dissenting
with opinion, seems directly to render the "alternative" provi-
sion ineffectiveY.72
Same-Defezdants. Several states by statute allow joinder
of defendants in the alternative.273 Under these provisions, it
268 See Cohn-Baer-Myers v. Realty Transfer Co., 117 App. Div. 215, 102
N. Y. Supp. 122 (1st Dept. 1907), affd 191 N. Y. 533, 84 N. E. 1110
(1908).
169 Love v. Keowne, 58 Tex. 191 (1882) ; Adams v. Conner, 73 Miss. 425,
19 So. 198 (1895) ; Alexander v. Mercer, 7 Ga. 549 (1849) ; State v. Brown,
58 Miss. 835 (1881). Contra: Oglesby's Sureties v. State, 73 Tex. 653, 11
S. W. 873 (1889) (not citing the Keowne case); Clark v. Lord Rivers, L. R.
5 Eq. Cas. 91 (1867).
170 See Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co., 124 Blinn. 117, 144
N. W. 450 (1913); 51 L. R. A. (N. s.) 640 (1914) annotation; (1926) 41
A. L. R. 1216; (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 1034; (1922) 35 ibid. 466; (1924)
33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 328, 369-372.
272. See New York, New Jersey and English statutes, quoted supra note 80.
27 2Olsen v. Bankers Trust Co., 205 App. Div. 669, 199 N. Y. Supp. 700
(1st Dept. 1923), crit'd (1924) 33 YALE LA w JoURNL 328.
3.73 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1920) § 211. By ibid. § 212, it is provided that
each defendant need not be interested in all the relief prayed for, or as to
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has been held that if A contracts with B who purports to be the
agent of C, and C later denies the agency, A can join B and C
in the alternative in an action on the contract. 1 4 Also, if X de-
livers goods to Y for Z, and Y claims to have so delivered them
but Z denies having received them, X can join Y and Z in the
alternative in a suit on the contract."" Or, again, if 0 is injured
in a collision between P and Q and cannot tell which of them was
negligent, he is allowed to join P and Q in the alternative in a
suit for damakes. 17 6  In a leading English case, where the plain-
tiff contracted to sell goods to A and then ordered them from B,
but upon delivery to A he claimed they were not as ordered, the
plaintiff was allowed to sue A and B together, claiming the con-
tract price from the former or, in the alternative, damages for
breach of contract from the latter.177  Some other situations in
which the plaintiff must rely on the evidence as it develops at the
trial to fix responsibility, and where joinder is, therefore, allowed,
are set out in the note.178
It has been decided that the new provision does not make the
defendants, even though they are sued together, jointly respon-
sible for the purpose of removal to the federal courts.170 Accord-
ingly, even if one of the defendants is a resident of the same
state as the plaintiff, the latter cannot demand that the trial be
every cause of action included in any proceeding against him; but the
court may make such order as may appear just to prevent his embarass-
ment; and that a plaintiff in doubt as to the person from whom he ig
entitled to redress may join two or more defendants. This follows the
English rules, o. 16, r. 4, 5, 7. See also Conn. Prac. Book (1922) § 155;
R. 1. Gen. Laws (1923) c. 333, § 20; N. J. P. L. (1912) p. 378, § 6; ibid.
p. 385, rule 7; Wis. Stat. (1921) § 2603.
17' Stein, Hall & Co. v. Alison & Co., 123 Misc. 382, 205 N. Y. Supp. 422
(1st Dept. 1924); Schechtman v. Salaway, 204 App. Div. 549, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 851 (2nd Dept. 1923); Eames v. Mayo, 93 Conn. 479, 106 Atl. 825
(1919); see Elliott v. McNeil & Sons Co., 206 App. Div. 441, 201 X. Y.
Supp. 500 (1st Dept. 1923).275 S. & C. Clothing Co. v. U. S. Trucking Corp., 216 App. Div. 482, 215
N. Y. Supp. 349 (1st Dept. 1926); (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 901; Hummer-
stone v. Leary [1921] 2 K. B. 664; Thermoid Rubber Co. v. Baird Rubber
Co., 124 Misc. 774, 209 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1925); of. Stern v. Ide
Co., 212 App. Div. 714, 209 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dept. 1925), crit'd in
(1925) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL 113; (1926) 26 COL. L. Rnv. 46.
17GJacobs v. Barron, 215 App. Div. 560, 214 N. Y. Supp. 261 (1st Dept.
1926) ; Besterman v. British Motor Cab Co. [1914] 3 K. B. 181.
177 Payne v. British Time Recorder Co. [1921] 2 K. B. 1. The English
cases are included in a review of the subject in (1926) 41 A. L. R. 1216,
1244. Cf., however, Stern v. Ide, supra note 175.
178 Lonnberg v. Knox, 123 Misc. 148, 204 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1st Dept. 1924)
(seaman sues for wages-in doubt which of defendants operated the ship) ;
Zenith Bathing Pavilion v. Fair Oaks S. S. Corp., 211 App. Div. 492, 207
N. Y. Supp. 306 (1st Dept. 1925), reversed on other grounds, 240 N. Y.
307, 148 N. E. 532 (1925).
179 Lynch v. Springfield Ins. Co., 15 F. (2d) 725 (E. D. N. Y. 1926).
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in the state court. It has also been held that merely because
the plaintiff is allowed to sue defendants in the alternative does
not of itself justify an attachment prior to trial against the
property of each defendant. It seems that an attachment will
not be sustained against a particular defendant unless there is a
prima facie case against him, without regard to the other de-
fendant or defendants.-,,
REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS SUITS
The most important exception to the equity rules of compulsory
joinder was the representative or class suit.OL In practice it
was found that if everyone whose interest would be directly af-
fected by a decree had to be before the court, oftentimes a con-
troversy would be left unsettled. Thus where some heirs of a
deceased landowner were missing, the remainder might be pre-
vented from suing to quiet title to the land or to set aside a fraud-
ulent conveyance. Or, where a defendant, along with several
hundred others, made a subscription to a building fund, it was
practically impossible to compel all of the subscribers to sue as
plaintiffs to collect the sum due. So, often, it would be impossible
or impracticable to bring before the court all the defendants
whose interests would be affected, as in cases involving the con-
struction of wills, where contingent interests were outstanding
in children not yet born. To meet these and similar situations,
the doctrine of the class suit was early developed in equity and
finds expression in the code provision 'r- that, "when the question
is one of a common or general interest of many persons or when
the parties are numerous and it might be impracticable to bring
'1 Zenith Bathing Pavilion v. Fair Oaks S. S. Corp., azipra note 178,
crit'd in (1925) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL 228; ef. (1926) 26 COL. L. RV. 48.
See also Whitman v. Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co., 210 N. Y. Supp. 91.7 (2d
Dept. 1925).283- Two of the early equity decisions on this subject were Bromley v.
Williams, 32 Beav. 177 (1863), and Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321
(1809).
182 Found in the following codes: Ala. Code (1923) § 5701; Alaska Code
(1913) § 871; Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1913) § 416; Ark. Dig. Stat. (1921) §
1098; Cal. C. C. P. (1923) § 382; Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) § 60019; Ind.
Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 277; Iowa Code (1924) § 10974; Ran. Rev. Stat.
(1923) § 60-413; Ky. Ann. Civ. Code (Seymour, 1924) § 25; Minn. Gen.
Stat. (1923) § 9165; Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 9083; Neb. Coamp. Stat.
(1922) § 8543; Nev. Rev. Laws (1912) § 5001; N. M. Ann. Stat. (1915) §
4079; N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1920) § 195; N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) § 457;
N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 7406; Ohio Gen. Ann. Code (Page, 192G) §
11257; Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) § 221; Or. C. C. P. (1920) § 391; Porto
Rico R. S. & Code (1913) § 5050; S. C. C. C. P. (1922) § 362; S. D. Rev.
Code (1919) § 2315; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) § 6510; Wash. Coamp. Stat.
(Rem. 1922) § 190; Wis. Stat. (1921) § 2604; Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920) §
5595; U. S. Equity Rules (1912) § 38. The English provision is zet out
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them all into court (within a reasonable time) 183 one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole."
The main concern of the courts in enforcing this provision is
that some party actually before the court will so represent the
numbers of the class of which he is the representative, that their
interests will be fully protected. When the purpose of the suit
is to extinguish a property interest, greater strictness is re-
quired in seeing that the party is truly representative.
Plaintiffs. Among the types of cases in which a plaintiff is
allowed to represent a class are suits by one of many subscribers
to a fund to collect an unpaid subscription; 184 by one of many
cestuis to recover trust money; 185 by one of a large number of
creditors to enforce stockholders' liability; 18D by members of an
unincorporated association for an accounting of association prop-
erty; '187 by a taxpayer to recover taxes illegally collected, or to
set aside an assessment; s and by one of several heirs to set
aside 189 a fraudulent conveyance. Other situations in which
the class suit is used by a plaintiff are set out in the note."" It
is not necessary that there be botk a common question and a
large number in the class.191 And it will depend largely on the
in WHITE, TnE ANNUAL PRACTI cE (1924) 235. Express provision is made
for the class suit only in case the parties are numerous in Conn. Gen. Stat.
(1918) § 5643, and Ga. Code (1926). § 5415.
183 Found in the Arkansas and Kentucky statutes cited supra note 182.
184 Hodges v. Nalty, 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. 726 (1899).
185 Conroy v. Cover, 252 Pac. 883 (Colo. 1927); Wheelock v. First Pres.
Church, 119 Cal. 477, 51 Pac. 841 (1897).
186 Adams v. Clark, 36 Colo. 65, 85 Pac. 642 (1906).
187Bates v. Houston, 66 Ga. 198 (1880). Ace: Hichens v. Congrove, 4
Russ. 562 (1828) (as to shareholders of a corporation).
188 Com. v. Scott, 112 Ky. 252, 65 S. W. 596 (1901). As to the conclusive-
ness of the judgments in such suits, see Greenberg v. Chicago, 256 I1. 213,
49 L. R. A. (N. s.) 108 (1912) annotation (conclusive on other taxpayers) ;
Lee v. Independent School Dist., 149 Iowa 345, 37 L. R. A. (w. s.) 383
(1910) (not conclusive upon the contractor who did the public work for
which the assessment was laid), Cf. also Puget Sound Lt. & Power Co.
v. Seattle, 5 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), (1925) 25 CoL. L. REV. 191.
189 Hendrix v. Money, 1 Bush. 306 (Ky. 1866) ; Thames v. Jones, 97 N. C.
121, 1 S. E. 692 (1887).
'9o Jones v. Newlon, 253 Pac. 386 (Colo. 1927) (three negro school chil-
dren sue by next friends to enjoin execution of order of Board of Educa-
tion).; Supreme Tribe v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1921)
(some of policy holders sue to enjoin use of company funds) ; Clay v. Selah
Valley Irr. Co., 14 Wash. 543, 45 Pac. 141 (1896) (some of bondholders sue
to foreclose deed of trust); United Cloak Assn.*v. Sigman, 218 App. Div.
367, 218 N. Y. Supp. 483 (1st Dept. 1926) (membership corporation sues
to enjoin intimidation of its members); Trade Press Pub. Co. v. Milwaukee
Typo. Union, 180 Wis. 449, 193 N. W. 507 (1923) (some employers sue for
all in city in their trade to enjoin alleged conspiracy to force a closed shop).
191 McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb. 516 (N. Y. 1851); Hilton Bridge
Const. Co. v. Foster, 26 Misc. 338, 57 N. Y. Supp. 140 (Sup. Ct. 1899), aff'd
42 App. Div. 630, 59 N. Y. Supp. 1106 (1899). It has been questioned
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type of case and the surrounding circumstances how large a
number of persons would be required to constitute a "class." 1-2
The procedure involved in a class suit may be illustrated by
following through a case of one creditor of the X company suing,
as he alleges in his petition, on behalf of himself and such other
creditors of the X company as may wish to join, to enforce pay-
ment of unpaid stock subscriptions. If no other creditor join
in suing before trial, the plaintiff has control over details of
management of the trial. It is often stated by way of dictum 13
that the plaintiff has complete control of the suit and may dismiss
it whenever he sees fit. But it seems probable, in accordance
with a statement in an early equity case,94 that if the time limi-
tation which equity courts set in analogy to the statute of limi-
tations had run against an independent suit by the other credi-
tors who had relied on the plaintiff's suit, or if they would be
otherwise prejudiced, the plaintiff would not be allowed to dis-
miss the action against their objections. It has been so held.19
The other creditors, in order to avoid costs, statutory bonds, etc.,
in case the suit is unsuccessful, may not want to join as formal
parties. If, however, they ask before trial to be let in, the court
may admit them and they can share in the control of the suit.U1
At any time up to the interlocutory decree, they may join or may
start separate suits.107 If the plaintiff secures such a decree, it
operates in favor not only of himself but all of the other credi-
tors. Thereafter they cannot start separate suits,203 but can
only prove their claims in the representative action. In default
of such proof before final judgment, and in the absence of fraud,
they are thereafter barred from participating in the proceeds of
the judgment. 99
whether the statute may apply to parties unitcd in intcrest (where joinder
is otherwise compulsory). 30 Cyc. 134, citing George v. Benjamin, 100
Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619 (1898). It seems clear, however, from the history
nnd wording of the provision that the contrary is the case. McKenzie
v. L'Amoureux, supra; Tobin v. Portland Mills Co. 41 Or. 269 (1902).
192 George v. Benjamin, supra note 191 (31 not sufficient in a suit to
collect an assessment); Farley v. Alderson, 190 Ky. 632, 227 S. W. 1005
(1921) (5 out of 9 people couldn't represent the class as defendants in
suit to quiet title).
193 See, for example, Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185, 1 N. E. 663
(1885).
194 Sterndale v. Hankinson, 1 Sim. 393 (1827).
M2 Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron Co., 46 Fed. 336 (W. D. Pa. 1891).
Contra: Piedmont Ins. Co. v. Maury, 75 Va. 508 (1881).
196 Manning v. Mercantile Trust Co., 37 Misc. 215, 75 N. Y. Supp. 168
(Sup. Ct. 1902).
197 See MacArdell v. Olcott, 62 App. Div. 127, 70 N. Y. Supp. 930 (1st
Dept. 1901); Woodgate v. Field, 2 Hare 211 (1842).
198 See Kerr v. Blodgett, 48 N. Y. 62 (1871).
1 ,Kerr v. Blodgett, supra note 198. The prior judgment, however, in
its final form must, in order for the matter to be res adjudicata as to per-
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The "statute of limitations" ceases to operate against all mem-
bers of the class who participate in the plaintiff's judgment at
the time when the plaintiff starts suit.00
The representative or class suit should not be confused with
the typical case of permissive joinder of plaintiffs, such as an
action for damages by one of many persons injured through a
single act of the defendant. Thus, the English Court of King's
Bench has decided 201 that the class suit was not a proper method
of suing to collect-damages for the act of a defendant ship owner,
whereby a ship containing parcels of goods separately belonging
to a large number of people, among them the plaintiff, was
destroyed. One of the judges stated that no tort action for dam-
ages could be framed to come within the doctrine of representa-
tive suits; that while the cargo owners would be permitted to
join under the "common question of law or fact" rule, they should
not be compelled to have their claims settled together.202  In
other words, the circumstances surrounding the claims of the
various shippers were sufficiently different so that, in the court's
opinion, no "class" existed. The class suit doctrine in equity
was developed to allow the settlement of suits which otherwise
could not be tried because of the lack of necessary parties or the
impracticability of getting them all into court. No such situa-
tion existed in the case before the English court. In spite of the
undoubted shortening of litigation which would follow an ex-
tension of the doctrine to cases of suits for damages by separate
contractees, it is doubtful whether courts would allow the exten-
sion under present code provisions.
It is impossible to summarize for all situations just when a
sufficient identity of interests exists to employ the class suit. To
take a specific example, however, suppose a municipality has (a)
voted road bonds, and (b) in the subsequent construction of the
road has negligently injured the property of A, B and C. If A
sues as representative of the property owners affected by the
sons who were not formal parties, make it clear that the members of the
class who did not come in are barred from later suing. Santilli v. Illinois
Surety Company, 79 Misc. 600 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., App. T. 1st Dept. 1913).
200 Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788 (1887); Dunne V.
Portland Ry., 40 Or. 295, 65 Pac. 1052 (1901); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick,
supra note 193.
201 Iarkt & Co. v. Knight S. S. Co., Ltd. [1910] 2 K. B. 1021. See also
Vashon Fruit Union v. Godwin & Co., 87 Wash. 384, 151 Pac. 797 (1915);
Aberconway v. Whetnall, 87 L. J. Ch. 524 (1918).
202 These actions for damages, where joinder is permissive but not com-
pulsory, have been called "non-derivative representative actions." See, for
example, Atkins v. Trowbridge, 162 App. Div. 629, 148 N. Y. Supp. 181
(1st Dept. 1914) ; 4 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 748. This ter.
minology seems confusing because the main features of a representative
action are lacking. True, outsiders are allowed to join as plaintiffs, but
the case is rather one of intervention or of consolidation of actions.
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road, and claims that the bonds were illegally voted, we have a
typical class suit; but if he attempts to sue as representative of
the property owners and alleges that he and they have been in-
jured by the negligent act of the municipality during the con-
struction of the road, the action is not a class suit. B and C are
allowed to join as plaintiffs, if they so desire, under the more lib-
eral code joinder provisions, but A cannot force them to join.
Defendaznts. A typical case in which one person is allowed to
defend for a class occurs when property held in common under
a will or otherwise is sought to be partitioned.=°a Here, it is evi-
dent, the property of the parties whom the defendant will repre-
sent is merely changed from a joint interest to a separate inter-
est in a part of the same property, or into cash. Another
example is the case of a trustee representing beneficiaries in a
suit involving the trust property.0 4 But the equity courts, and
also the code courts, have gone further and entirely divested a
person of a contingent property interest although he was not a
party to the suit. For example, a will may be contested and
overthrown although it gives a contingent interest in land to
people in being who cannot be brought before the court : or to
unborn children.206 But the courts are careful in such cases
to safeguard the interests of the absent people. There must
exist some good reason for trying the issue 2o, as that an estate
should be settled up at once. Or, as it is sometimes stated, the
suit must not be designed fraudulently to cut off the contingent
interests. And there must be someone before the court, such as
a guardian or other devisee, representing the same class or in-
terest.2o'
If these safeguards are present, the result of the suit will be
conclusive against collateral attack.209 Of course, in, a later suit
between the same parties, including those absent at the first trial,
203 Coquillard v. Coquillard, 62 Ind. App. 426, 113 N. E. 474 (1916);
Springs v. Scott, 132 N. C. 548, 44 S. E. 116 (1903) ; Jordan v. Jordan, 145
Tenn. 378, 239 S. W. 423 (1922). For a discussion of class suits in regard
to defendants, see Note (1922) 36 HARV. L. Rsv. 89.204 Ogden v. Syphrett, 236 S. W. 143 (Ten. Civ. App. 1922); Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup. Ct. 420 (1926).2 0oLongworth v. Duff, 297 IM. 479, 130 N. E. 690 (1921); Schnepfe v.
Schnepfe, 230 Fed. 781 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916).206 McCampbell v. Mason, 151 Ill. 500, 38 N. E. 672 (1894) ; Mathews v.
Lightner, 85 Minn. 333, 88 N. W. 992 (1902).2 07 Bears v. Corbett, 152 N. E. 866 (Ind. 1926).
208 McCampbell v. Mason, supra note 206; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, mupra
note 205; Longworth v. Duff, supra note 205. In a suit for an accounting,
where the remaindermen have conflicting interests, the trustee will not be
allowed to represent all remaindermen including those who are absent.
Franz v. Buder, 11 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).209Cases cited supra note 208. See also Greenberg v. Chicago, supra
note 188.
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if no interests of third persons have intervened, and the court
believes that the absent persons were not adequately represented,
the case may be reopened.2 0
It therefore appears that representative actions have their
chief utility in allowing suits to be brought in certain cases
where otherwise it would be impossible to get all the parties be-
fore the court. But the usefulness of this procedure is limited
by the quite natural hesitation of courts to hold parties bound
by judgments rendered in their absence. For instance, it seems
that ordinary damage actions and severable contract actions can-
not be disposed of in this manner. But where a specific res, realty
or chattel, is before the court, title to it may be adjusted when
the conditions are present for this form of action. And again
a question of general public interest rather than particular per-
sonal interest to a party may be so settled. Beyond this the op-
portunities for its use do not seem numerous.
21oBears v. Corbett, supra note 207.
